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CONDUCT RULES
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Attorneys receive inadvertent disclosures of confidential informa-
tion in various forms—a misdirected e-mail containing a conversation
between opposing counsel and her client; privileged and work prod-
uct protected documents mistakenly included in documents pro-
duced in discovery; notes between an opposing attorney and his client
embedded in the metadata of a draft contract.  With high-speed com-
munication and a staggering volume of electronically stored informa-
tion, the risks of inadvertent disclosure are greater today than ever
before.  These disclosures create a dilemma for both sending and re-
ceiving attorneys: The sender wants to mitigate the damage, while the
recipient wants to use the information to the extent doing so does not
violate any legal or professional conduct obligations.
Certainly one risk of inadvertent disclosure is privilege waiver.
This issue has been the primary focus of commentators and lawmakers
in recent years, resulting in amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 2006 and the enactment of Federal Rule of Evidence
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502 in 2008.1  But these changes in the law do not address many of the
problems associated with inadvertent disclosure.  Transactional attor-
neys have no practical means to obtain the return of an inadvertently
disclosed document; litigators are often unable to protect the content
of a privileged document pending a waiver ruling; and litigators and
non-litigators alike face uncertainty in dealing with confidential
metadata.  Adding to these problems, the new rule of evidence incen-
tivizes little or no pre-production privilege review even though there is
a continuing risk of waiver under the rule.2
In most jurisdictions, professional conduct rules provide limited
guidance in addressing these questions.  In states that have adopted
American Bar Association Model Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4(b),
a recipient of an inadvertent disclosure is only required to notify send-
ing counsel of the mistake.3  Comments to the rule add that whether
counsel should do more is “a matter of law beyond the scope of these
Rules.”4  Determining the appropriate response can be even more dif-
ficult in states that have not adopted Model Rule 4.4(b).  Attorneys in
those jurisdictions must determine if a different professional conduct
rule, ethics opinion, or case provides guidance.  Further, Model Rule
1.6—the Confidentiality of Information rule—does not address two
emerging confidentiality issues, which include confidential informa-
tion in metadata and the disclosure of confidential information pursu-
ant to a clawback or quick peek agreement or order (as contemplated
by the new federal rules).5
This Article will consider the full breadth of the inadvertent dis-
closure problem and explain that professional conduct rules are an
essential part of a solution.  Part I will open by discussing inadvertent
disclosure in modern practice.  This Part will explain that inadvertent
disclosure is an issue for all lawyers, not just litigators.  Part II will then
provide the history of the professional conduct rules and ethics opin-
ions addressing inadvertent disclosure.  Part III will outline other per-
tinent sources of law, including recent revisions to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Part IV will
then explain how all sources of authority work together to address
various circumstances of inadvertent disclosure.  This discussion will
reveal numerous questions and developing problems that remain
unanswered.
1. FED. R. CIV. P. 16, 26; FED. R. EVID. 502.
2. See FED. R. EVID. 502.
3. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2009).
4. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) cmt. 2 (2009).
5. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2009).
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It is against this backdrop that the remaining Parts will consider
the appropriateness of a professional conduct solution.  Part V will
discuss confidentiality and other interests that would be furthered by
revising professional conduct rules to address inadvertent disclosure.
Unlike federal rules, professional conduct rules can address the bar’s
interests in all contexts (not just discovery), in all courts (not just fed-
eral), and for all attorneys (not just litigators).  Part VI will propose
revisions to the current Confidentiality of Information rule to clarify
counsel’s obligation in two contexts: (1) seeking client consent to
quick peek and clawback agreements and orders; and (2) proactively
preventing disclosure in metadata.  Finally, Part VII will outline a new
“inadvertent disclosure” professional conduct rule that purposely, but
perhaps ironically, contains no reference to the term “inadvertent.”
Instead, the proposal requires counsel to provide defined protections
to an opponent’s privileged or work product protected information.
This Part will consider how the proposed rule would create a better
framework for dealing with inadvertent disclosure in litigation, answer
the problems of transactional lawyers, and provide guidance to liti-
gators and non-litigators who might send or receive confidential infor-
mation in metadata.
I. INADVERTENT DISCLOSURE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION IN
MODERN PRACTICE
A. Terminology
This Article uses the phrase “inadvertent disclosure” in its
broadest sense to describe a disclosure of confidential6 client informa-
tion to opposing counsel with no intent to reveal confidential infor-
mation or to waive attorney-client privilege or work product
protection.7  This definition is intended to encompass the full range
of mistaken, negligent, grossly negligent, and reckless disclosures.8
6. An attorney is required to maintain the confidentiality of “information relating to
the representation of a client,” unless the client authorizes the attorney to disclose. MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2009).
7. The attorney-client privilege provides that a communication between attorney and
client made in confidence for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance can-
not be compelled in discovery or introduced in evidence. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); FED.
R. EVID. 501, 502(g)(1); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).  Similarly,
an attorney’s work product—materials prepared in anticipation of litigation by or for a
party or its representative—can generally be protected against discovery. See FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(3); FED. R. EVID. 502(g)(2); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947).
8. This definition excludes an intentional disclosure when counsel did not intend to
waive privilege or work product protection, such as under terms of a quick peek agree-
ment. See infra text accompanying note 103. R
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Some courts have adopted a similar definition, treating disclosures as
“inadvertent” if the sending attorney asserts waiver was not intended.9
In other jurisdictions, inadvertence turns on the care or lack of care
by disclosing counsel (such as the precautions taken to prevent disclo-
sure, extent of the mistake, and timeliness of corrective measures).10
Accordingly, such jurisdictions might conclude that a grossly negli-
gent or reckless disclosure is not inadvertent, but a negligent disclo-
sure is inadvertent.11
This definitional issue creates an unexpected problem.  The
problem does not lie in how courts utilize these definitions; two courts
may define the term differently, yet apply identical tests to determine
waiver.12  The problem is that attorneys are frequently required to de-
termine “inadvertence” by professional conduct rules, ethics opinions,
case law, agreements, or court orders, and they often define the term
narrowly to avoid any obligation to the opponent.
This is exemplified by counsel’s conduct in Holland v. Gordy Co.13
When reviewing thirteen boxes of documents produced by defense
counsel, plaintiff’s lawyer, Thomas Bishoff, found that one box con-
tained confidential attorney memoranda and other litigation files.14
Precedent existed in the jurisdiction regarding receiving counsel’s ob-
9. See, e.g., Bensel v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 248 F.R.D. 177, 180 (D.N.J. 2008) (deter-
mining that disclosure was “inadvertent” because there was no evidence indicating that the
documents were produced intentionally, and then considering five factors to determine
whether the “inadvertent” disclosure resulted in waiver); Minatronics Corp. v. Buchanan
Ingersoll, P.C., No. GD92-7496, 1995 WL 520686, at *7–*9 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Allegheny
County Feb. 14, 1995) (citing Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 109 F.R.D. 323, 332 (N.D.
Cal. 1985), as representative of these jurisdictions).
10. See Minatronics Corp., 1995 WL 520686, at *6–*7 (citing Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc.
v. Levi Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D. 103, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), as representative of these juris-
dictions); see also Lightbourne v. McCollum, 969 So. 2d 326, 333–34 n.6 (Fla. 2007) (ex-
plaining that the five-factor test is used to determine if the disclosure is inadvertent).
11. See VLT, Inc. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 54 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 1319, 1321–22 (D.
Mass. 2003) (noting that some jurisdictions do not consider grossly negligent or reckless
disclosures inadvertent, but that others consider anything other than a deliberate decision
to waive the privilege inadvertent).
12. In jurisdictions that use the five-factor balancing test to determine waiver, one
camp uses the five-factor test to determine if it is fair for the “inadvertent disclosure” to
result in waiver; the other camp uses the five-factor test to determine if the disclosure is in
fact inadvertent, which does not result in waiver. See Minatronics Corp., 1995 WL 520686, at
*9.  Regardless of the definition of “inadvertent,” the test theoretically should produce the
same result.  The fact that it does not is a result of the flexibility of the test rather than the
definition given to “inadvertent.” See infra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing un- R
certainty in balancing jurisdictions).
13. Nos. 231183–85, 2003 WL 1985800 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2003).
14. Id. at *1.  Bishoff would later testify that “he was somewhat excited to find” a confi-
dential memorandum prepared by opposing counsel. Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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ligations upon receipt of an inadvertent disclosure.15  While it is not
clear whether Bishoff or the colleagues he consulted were aware of
that precedent, they discussed whether the disclosure was inadvertent
and concluded that it was not because “the documents were intention-
ally produced by defendants.”16  One of Bishoff’s colleagues directed
him to write down in detail the contents of one particular memoran-
dum in case it “would never see the light of day again.”17  Bishoff
made handwritten notes that were a verbatim copy of the most signifi-
cant memorandum, had the entire litigation file copied, and provided
copies of the documents to co-counsel.18
B. Inadvertent Disclosure in Modern Practice
Clients and their attorneys are creating and maintaining ever-in-
creasing volumes of electronically stored information and have the
means to communicate that information to third parties with great
ease.19  By 2011, experts estimate that the world will create, capture,
or replicate nearly 1800 exabytes of information20: This is ten times
more information than created in 2006, which was roughly the
equivalent of “3 million times the information in all the books ever
written.”21  For the first time in 2007, there was more information
than permanent storage available for that information.22  For an attor-
ney representing a business client, the amount of data can be stagger-
15. Id. at *7 (citing Resolution Trust Corp. v. First of Am. Bank, 868 F. Supp. 217,
220–21 (W.D. Mich. 1994)).
16. Id. at *1 n.8.
17. Id. at *1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
18. Id. at *2.
19. See Emily Burns et al., E-Discovery: One Year of the Amended Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 201, 201–02 (2008) (describing the recent information
explosion, including a comparison of the five exabytes of data created by the world in 2002
with the 161 exabytes created in 2006); Dennis R. Kiker, Waiving the Privilege in a Storm of
Data: An Argument for Uniformity and Rationality in Dealing With the Inadvertent Production of
Privileged Materials in the Age of Electronically Stored Information, 12 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 15, 3–6
(2006) (describing the increase in electronic information, including business information
potentially subject to discovery); George L. Paul & Jason R. Baron, Information Inflation:
Can the Legal System Adapt?, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10, 5–6 (2007) (describing the recent
“evolutionary burst in writing technology” that includes “digitization; real time computing;
the microprocessor; the personal computer; e-mail; local and wide-area networks leading
to the Internet; the evolution of software, which has ‘locked in’ seamless editing as an
almost universal function; [and] the World Wide Web”).
20. JOHN F. GANTZ ET AL., THE DIVERSE AND EXPLODING DIGITAL UNIVERSE: AN UPDATED
FORECAST OF WORLDWIDE INFORMATION GROWTH THROUGH 2011 3 (2008), http://
www.emc.com/collateral/analyst-reports/diverse-exploding-digital-universe.pdf.
21. JOHN F. GANTZ, THE EXPANDING DIGITAL UNIVERSE: A FORECAST OF WORLDWIDE IN-
FORMATION GROWTH THROUGH 2010 1 (2007),  http://www.emc.com/collateral/analyst-
reports/expanding-digital-idc-white-paper.pdf.
22. GANTZ ET AL., supra note 20, at 2.
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ing.  A company with five hundred employees, each of whom
conservatively average twenty e-mails per day, will produce at least
2,500,000 e-mail messages per year.23  By one estimate, today’s “small”
business likely has the equivalent of two thousand four-drawer file
cabinets of records—all in the form of electronically stored
information.24
When attorneys are charged with handling this information for
their clients, it is now more difficult than ever to prevent the inadver-
tent disclosure of confidential information.  In only the past twenty
years, inadvertent disclosure has evolved from the slim possibility of
misaddressing an envelope, which seemed preventable, to a substan-
tial risk faced by every practicing attorney regardless of the care taken
to prevent it.25  The prospect of inadvertent disclosure strikes fear and
sometimes pain in the hearts of attorneys.26
23. Thomas V. Laprade, Can—Should—FDIC v. Singh Survive the Amendments to the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure?, 22 ME. B.J. 86, 88 (2007).
24. Paul & Baron, supra note 19, at 10. R
25. Titles, subjects, and dates of articles shed some light on how communication tech-
nology and formats of the information communicated have changed rapidly in recent
years, creating new issues of inadvertent disclosure. See, e.g., Anna G. Bruckner-Harvey,
Inadvertent Disclosure in the Age of Fax Machines: Is the Cat Really Out of the Bag?, 46 BAYLOR L.
REV. 385, 386 (1994) (considering whether the attorney-recipient of a missent facsimile has
a duty to his client to use the information or a duty to notify the sender and return the
document); Amy M. Fulmer Stevenson, Making a Wrong Turn on the Information Superhigh-
way: Electronic Mail, the Attorney-Client Privilege and Inadvertent Disclosure, 26 CAP. U. L. REV.
347, 357 (1997) (“Laurie realizes that she inadvertently sent [a highly sensitive, confiden-
tial] . . . document to opposing counsel. . . . Laurie’s confidential document is transiting
the twisty passages of the Internet labyrinth.”); Joseph W. Rand, What Would Learned Hand
Do?: Adapting to Technological Change and Protecting the Attorney-Client Privilege on the Internet,
66 BROOK. L. REV. 361, 362 (2000) (“[I]t is not just e-mail that raises . . . concerns regard-
ing confidentiality.  With the advent of online document repositories, cellular phones,
handheld wireless computers, and instant messaging, lawyers have all sorts of new and
exciting ways in which they can inadvertently breach their clients’ confidences.”); Joseph L.
Paller Jr., “Gentlemen Do Not Read Each Other’s Mail”: A Lawyer’s Duties upon Receipt of Inadver-
tently Disclosed Confidential Information, 21 LAB. LAW. 247, 247 (2006) (discussing a scenario
that illustrates the hazards of inadvertent disclosure when a large volume of documents is
produced in an electronic format); David Hricik, I Can Tell When You’re Telling Lies: Ethics
and Embedded Confidential Information, 30 J. LEGAL PROF. 79, 82 (2006) (providing an exam-
ple of how forwarding electronic documents containing metadata can disclose confidential
client information).
26. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Co. v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp., 138 F.R.D. 479,
479–80 (E.D. Va. 1991) (“The inadvertent production of a privileged document is a specter
that haunts every document intensive case.”); Laprade, supra note 23, at 86.  Mr. Laprade R
shares the following:
If you’ve never experienced the sudden loss of the ability to inhale or exhale, if
you’ve never felt your heart beat 120 times in a minute while sitting still, if you’ve
never fought to hold a look of sangfroid while every muscle in your face is aching
to twitch, then you’ve never inadvertently disclosed privileged documents in a
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Litigators face two unique inadvertent disclosure problems—the
risk that inadvertent disclosure will occur during discovery27 and the
possibility that the judge presiding over a case will rule that an inad-
vertent disclosure waived the attorney-client privilege or work product
protection.28  Beyond these distinctive issues of litigation, inadvertent
disclosure is a problem for all attorneys.  Litigators and transactional
attorneys29 alike use e-mail, facsimile, and mail to communicate with
opposing counsel.30  There are numerous examples of inadvertent dis-
closures occurring in situations such as these—all outside the discov-
ery context.31  Further, transactional attorneys provide large volumes
Maine federal court case that surface for the first time during your client’s
deposition.
Id.
27. See, e.g., Koch Foods of Ala., LLC v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 303 F. App’x 841, 846
(11th Cir. 2008) (stating that plaintiff’s counsel inadvertently disclosed a privileged e-mail
during discovery); Bensel v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 248 F.R.D. 177, 179 (D.N.J. 2008) (dis-
cussing how allegedly privileged documents were produced in plaintiff’s initial disclosures
pursuant to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Grand River Enter. Six Na-
tions, Ltd. v. Pryor, No. 02 Civ. 5068(JFK)(DFE), 2008 WL 1826490, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
18, 2008) (noting that the sending attorney produced a privileged memorandum in re-
sponse to requests for production of documents); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) advisory
committee’s note on 2006 amendment (explaining that costs of preventing privilege dis-
closure and risks of waiver are often “more acute when discovery of electronically stored
information is sought”).
28. See, e.g., Bobbitt v. Acad. of Court Reporting, Inc., No. 07-10742, 2008 WL 4056323,
at *9–*10 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 26, 2008) (finding defendants waived privilege by disclosing e-
mail messages in discovery); Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household Int’l, Inc., 237
F.R.D. 176, 183 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (explaining that work product waiver is appropriate if
disclosure “substantially increases the opportunity for potential adversaries to obtain the
information” (citations omitted)).
29. This Article borrows Professor Steven L. Schwarcz’s description of transactional
lawyers: “[C]ounsel to parties in the negotiating, contract drafting, and opinion-giving pro-
cess leading to ‘closing’ a commercial, financing, or other business transaction.”  Steven L.
Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 486, 486
(2007).
30. See Robert A. Barrer, Unintended Consequences: Avoiding and Addressing the Inadvertent
Disclosure of Documents, N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J., Nov.–Dec. 2005, at 35, 35 (describing scenarios
outside of discovery in which inadvertent disclosure can occur); Kathleen Maher, Don’t Fax,
Don’t Tell: Differing Opinions about ABA Opinions 92-368 and 94-382, 12 No. 4 PROF. LAW. 2, 2
(2001) (discussing inadvertent disclosure scenarios including misaddressed letters, incor-
rectly dialed fax numbers, and misdirected e-mail); Annie Dike, Comment, A Lucky Break or
an Ethical Dilemma?: Assessing the Appropriate Response in the Face of Inadvertent Disclosure, 31 J.
LEGAL PROF. 279, 282–83 (2007) (considering various uses of e-mail by counsel that may
lead to inadvertent disclosure).
31. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. First of Am. Bank, 868 F. Supp. 217, 218 (W.D.
Mich. 1994) (stating that defense counsel inadvertently sent a privileged letter intended
for his client to plaintiff’s counsel); Hydraflow, Inc. v. Enidine Inc., 145 F.R.D. 626, 638
(W.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting that privileged documents that were to be delivered to court for
an in camera review were mistakenly delivered to opposing counsel); Robertson v. Yamaha
Motor Corp., 143 F.R.D. 194, 195–96 (S.D. Ill. 1992) (stating that counsel, apparently
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of client documents and electronically stored information to other at-
torneys in non-discovery contexts, such as when completing due dili-
gence for a business transaction.32  Attorneys inside and outside of
litigation may provide confidential client information in metadata of
an electronic document.33  There are many other dealings between
opposing attorneys that may lead one to become the recipient of an
inadvertent disclosure.34
Whether a client’s confidences are disclosed in litigation or oth-
erwise, the client and counsel have an interest in containing the dam-
age.  Even if the issue of privilege waiver seems irrelevant, such as
when there is no pending litigation, a disclosing lawyer has created a
host of other problems for his or her client and self.  An attorney has
an ethical and fiduciary obligation to maintain confidentiality of client
communications.35  If the consequences of the disclosure are suffi-
ciently severe, the client may file an ethics complaint or sue the attor-
ney for professional negligence.  Further, the client has an interest in
preventing the information from being used to the client’s disadvan-
tage, both inside and outside the courtroom, in the present case or
transaction, and in any future litigation.  Disclosing counsel wants the
through clerical error, attached privileged documents to a letter sent to opposing coun-
sel). Also, in Dike, supra note 30, the author, without a reported decision on the issue, R
relies on the court filings in Glassroth v. Moore, 347 F.3d 916 (11th Cir. 2003), to describe
how plaintiff’s lead counsel accidentally faxed a litigation strategy letter to opposing coun-
sel, who in turn retained a copy of the letter, filed it with the court, and provided it to the
Alabama Christian Coalition, which posted the letter on its website.  Dike, supra note 30, at R
279–80. Plaintiff’s counsel filed a motion for protective order and sanctions, asking the
court to find that the work product privilege had not been waived by the inadvertent dis-
closure, but the case concluded prior to the court ruling on the motion. Id. at 280–81; see
also Glassroth, 347 F.3d 916, 917 (describing facts where plaintiffs filed an application for
fees and expenses, but no other motions).
32. In this context, attorneys also may disclose confidential information intentionally.
See Anne King, Comment, The Common Interest Doctrine and Disclosures during Negotiations for
Substantial Transactions, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1411, 1411–13 (2007) (discussing whether an
intentional disclosure of privileged or confidential information during the negotiation of
business transactions results in a waiver).  This is not unlike disclosure in litigation pursu-
ant to a quick peek agreement. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) advisory committee’s note on 2006
amendment (describing quick peek agreements).
33. See, e.g., Andrew M. Perlman, Untangling Ethics Theory from Attorney Conduct Rules:
The Case of Inadvertent Disclosures, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 767, 773–74 (2005) (suggesting a
hypothetical in which metadata reveals that the opposing party considered conceding an
important point in the contract negotiation).
34. See, e.g., Rico v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 171 P.3d 1092, 1094–95 (Cal. 2007) (ex-
plaining that inadvertent disclosure occurred when counsel left work product protected
material in a conference room after a deposition).
35. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2009) (noting the ethical obligation to
keep confidential all information learned in the representation of the client); RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16(3) (2000) (explaining that the fiduci-
ary duty of loyalty encompasses the obligation of confidentiality).
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receiving attorney to stop reading the document and return it, with-
out disseminating it or keeping notes about it, at least until a court
rules that any protection was waived.  The following Parts discuss the
professional conduct rules and other sources of law that govern
whether the recipient may, must, should, or should not take these
steps or others.
II. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULES GOVERNING INADVERTENT
DISCLOSURE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
A. History of Professional Conduct Rules, Ethics Opinions, and Case
Law
Early formulations of professional conduct rules contained no
rule specifically addressing inadvertent disclosure of confidential in-
formation.36  When the Model Rules of Professional Conduct were
adopted in 1983, the only provision that touched upon inadvertent
disclosure concerned the sending attorney’s obligation to prevent it:
Model Rule 1.6(a) requires an attorney to keep information learned
in the representation of the client confidential.37  This obligation en-
compasses the duty to prevent inadvertent disclosure.38
In 1992, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) Standing Com-
mittee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility issued Formal Opin-
ion 92-368, providing that a lawyer who receives an inadvertent
disclosure of privileged or confidential materials should do the follow-
ing: (1) refrain from examining the materials; (2) notify the sending
attorney; and (3) abide by the sending attorney’s instructions.39  The
committee acknowledged that a “narrow, literalistic” reading of the
Model Rules did not spell out this result.40  The committee explained
that its opinion was informed by the importance of confidentiality
under the Model Rules and the absence of a more important compet-
36. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (1983) (containing no reference to
inadvertent disclosure when adopted in 1983); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY
(1969) (containing no reference to inadvertent disclosure from its adoption in 1969 to the
end of its effectiveness); CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS (1908) (containing no reference to
inadvertent disclosure when first adopted in 1908 or during its lifespan).
37. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2009).
38. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 16 (2009) (stating that a lawyer must
act competently to prevent inadvertent disclosure of a client’s confidential information).
39. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-368 (1992), with-
drawn by Formal Op. 05-437 (2005).
40. Id.
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ing policy,41 the law governing waiver of the attorney-client privilege,42
the law governing missent property,43 the fact that analogous behavior
is condemned by the profession,44 and the attorney’s obligations to
his or her client.45
ABA Formal Opinion 92-368 received a mixed reaction.  Some
jurisdictions were critical that the opinion was not based on any ex-
plicit requirements found in the Model Rules.46  Others asserted that
it was inconsistent with an attorney’s duty of zealous advocacy and that
it inappropriately required the receiving attorney to fix an opponent’s
mistake.47  Despite such criticism, several states relied upon ABA For-
mal Opinion 92-368 in their own ethics opinions48 and case law.49
41. Id. (considering and rejecting competing interests in punishing carelessness, en-
couraging greater care, resignation to the fact that the harm cannot be undone, and zeal-
ous advocacy).
42. Id. (explaining that disclosure does not necessarily result in privilege waiver in liti-
gation, so, likewise, ethics rules should be able to dictate that disclosure does not result in a
document losing its confidential character).
43. Id. (arguing that the sending lawyer did not intend to relinquish title to the confi-
dential documents and might be considered to have created a bailment, which requires
the receiving lawyer to return the documents).
44. Id. (discussing another ethics opinion requiring an attorney to inform opposing
counsel of an inadvertent omission of a contract provision and hypothetical situations in
which it would be inappropriate for a lawyer to take advantage of an opportunity to review
an opponent’s confidential information).
45. Id. (explaining that although being a zealous representative may be thought to
include capitalizing on the mistake of an opponent, there are limits to the extent that the
lawyer should “go ‘all out’” for the client).
46. See, e.g., In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litig., 181 F.R.D. 680, 698 (N.D. Ga.
1998) (“Opinion 92-368 does not create a reasonable possibility that Plaintiffs’ counsel
violated a specifically identifiable ethical rule . . . .”); Me. Prof’l Ethics Comm’n, Op. 146
(1994) (refusing to follow ABA Formal Opinion 92-368 because it is not based on a specific
provision of the Model Rules), rev’d, Me. Prof’l Ethics Comm’n, Op. 172 (2000); Phila. Bar
Ass’n Prof’l Guidance Comm., Op. 94-3 (1994) (opining that an attorney’s failure to follow
ABA Formal Opinion 92-368 is not unethical behavior); see also American Bar Association
Center for Professional Responsibility, Model Rule 4.4: Reporter’s Explanation of Changes,
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k/e2k-rule44rem.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2010) (“Formal
Opinion 92-368 . . . has been criticized, in part because there is no provision of the Model
Rules directly on point.”).
47. See, e.g., Ill. State Bar Ass’n, Op. 98-04 (1999) (stating that Opinion 92-368 “places
the burden on the wrong party, asking the receiving lawyer to act contrary to the interests
of that lawyer’s client in order to protect the interests of the careless lawyer and that law-
yer’s client”); see also Maher, supra note 30, at 26 (“The judiciary, the bar, and commenta- R
tors have criticized [ABA Formal Opinion 92-368] for devaluing a lawyer’s duty to zealously
represent a client and for placing the burden on the receiving lawyer to protect the confi-
dentiality of a careless lawyer and his or her client.”).
48. See, e.g., Or. State Bar Bd. of Governors, Formal Op. 1998-150 (1998) (presumably
overruled by Formal Op. 2005-150 (2005) and OR. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b)
(2009)); Sup. Ct. of Tenn. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 2004-F-150 (2004)
(adopting the holding and rationale of ABA Formal Opinion 92-368); Va. State Bar Stand-
ing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 1702 (1997) (“ABA Formal Opinion 92-368 correctly
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Other jurisdictions required attorneys to follow the requirements of
ABA Formal Opinion 92-368 only if they knew the document was inad-
vertently disclosed prior to reading it.50  In still other jurisdictions, re-
ceiving attorneys were told that their foremost duty was to their own
client; thus, an inadvertent disclosure should be utilized to the advan-
tage of the receiving lawyer’s client.51
In 2002, the Model Rules were amended to add Model Rule
4.4(b), providing that a receiving lawyer who “knows or reasonably
should know that [a] document was inadvertently sent shall promptly
notify the sender.”52  Comments to the rule provide that the rule is
intended to allow the sending lawyer to take protective measures, but
whether the receiving lawyer “is required to take additional steps, such
as returning the original document, is a matter of law beyond the
scope of these Rules, as is the question of whether the privileged status
of a document has been waived.”53  The comments close by noting
that a lawyer may return an inadvertently disclosed document unread,
even if he or she has no legal obligation to do so.54
states the ethical duties of a lawyer who receives inadvertently transmitted confidential doc-
uments from opposing counsel or opposing counsel’s client.”).
49. See, e.g., Am. Express v. Accu-Weather, Inc., Nos. 91 CIV. 6485 (RWS) & 92 CIV. 705
(RWS), 1996 WL 346388, at *2–*3 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1996) (granting sending attorney’s
motion for sanctions based on ABA Formal Opinion 92-368 when receiving counsel re-
viewed and refused to return sender’s privileged document); Resolution Trust Corp. v.
First of Am. Bank, 868 F. Supp. 217, 219, 221 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (ordering inadvertently
sent letter to be destroyed based on ABA Formal Opinion 92-368); Rico v. Mitsubishi Mo-
tors Corp., 171 P.3d 1092, 1094 (Cal. 2007) (holding that recipient of inadvertent disclo-
sure may not read the document beyond what is necessary to determine it is privileged and
must notify sending counsel); State Comp. Ins. Fund v. WPS, Inc., 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 799,
807–08 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (fashioning a rule based on ABA Formal Opinion 92-368);
Corey v. Norman, Hanson & DeTroy, 742 A.2d 933, 941 (Me. 1999) (adopting the rule set
forth in ABA Formal Opinion 92-368).
50. See, e.g., D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 256 (1995); Ill. State Bar Ass’n, Op. 98-
04 (1999).
51. See, e.g., Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Transp. Indem. Ins., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867–68
(Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that an attorney has a professional obligation to his client to
utilize information learned through an opponent’s inadvertent disclosure); Mass. Bar
Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 1999-4 (1999) (finding that the duty to zealously re-
present an attorney’s own client requires the receiving attorney to reject a request that a
privileged letter be returned).
52. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2009).
53. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 2 (2009).
54. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 3 (2009) (explaining that some law-
yers may decide to return a document without reading it, “for example, when the lawyer
learns before receiving the document that it was inadvertently sent to the wrong address,”
and that “the decision to voluntarily return such a document is a matter of professional
judgment ordinarily reserved to the lawyer” when the lawyer is not legally required to do so
(citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2, 1.4 (2009))).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\69-2\MLR201.txt unknown Seq: 12 19-MAR-10 14:54
206 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 69:195
Following the adoption of Model Rule 4.4(b), the ABA Ethics
Committee issued its Formal Opinion 05-437 withdrawing ABA For-
mal Opinion 92-368.55
Thirty-two states have adopted Model Rule 4.4(b) or a substan-
tially similar provision.56  Eight states and the District of Columbia
have adopted their own professional conduct rules that require receiv-
ing counsel to take one or more steps beyond notification.57  In thirty-
55. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 05-437 (2005).
56. ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2009); ARK. RULES OF PROF’L CON-
DUCT R. 4.4(b) (2005); CONN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2009); DEL. LAWYERS’
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2009); FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4–4.4(b)
(2009); IDAHO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2003); ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 4.4(b) (2010); IND. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2005); IOWA RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 32:4.4(b) (2009); KAN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2007); MINN.
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2007); MISS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b)
(2005); MO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4–4.4(b) (2007); MONT. RULES OF PROF’L CON-
DUCT R. 4.4(b) (2005); NEB. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3–504.4(b) (2008); NEV. RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2006); N.M. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 16-404(b)
(2009); N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2009); N.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 4.4(b) (2005); N.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.5(a) (2006); OHIO RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2007); OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2008); OR. RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2009); PA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2006); R.I.
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2008); S.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b)
(2009); S.D. RULES OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 4.4(b) (2004); UTAH RULES OF PROF’L CON-
DUCT R. 4.4(b) (2009); VT. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2009); WASH. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2006); WIS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT FOR ATTORNEYS R.
20:4.4(b) (2009); WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2009).
57. ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2008) (stating that a lawyer, who “knows
or reasonably should know that the document was inadvertently sent, should promptly
notify the sender” as well as “(1) abide by the reasonable instructions of the sender regard-
ing the disposition of the document; or (2) submit the issue to an appropriate tribunal for
a determination of the disposition of the document”); ARIZ. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
4.4(b) (2004) (“A lawyer who receives a document and knows or reasonably should know
that the document was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender and preserve the
status quo for a reasonable period of time in order to permit the sender to take protective
measures.”); COLO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2008) (“A lawyer who receives a
document relating to the representation of the lawyer’s client and knows or reasonably
should know that the document was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender.”);
COLO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(c) (2008) (explaining that unless a court permits
otherwise, “a lawyer who receives a document relating to the representation of the lawyer’s
client and who, before reviewing the document, receives notice from the sender that the
document was inadvertently sent, shall not examine the document and shall abide by the
sender’s instructions as to its disposition”); D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b)
(2007) (stating that a lawyer who receives any “writing relating to the representation of a
client and knows, before examining the writing, that it has been inadvertently sent, shall
not examine the writing, but shall notify the sending party and abide by the instructions of
the sending party regarding the return or destruction of the writing”); KY. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2009) (stating that a lawyer who “knows or reasonably should know
that the document was inadvertently sent shall: (1) refrain from reading the document, (2)
promptly notify the sender, and (3) abide by the instructions of the sender regarding its
disposition”); LA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2008) (stating that a lawyer who
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nine of these forty-one jurisdictions with a professional conduct rule
addressing the issue, the receiving attorney has no obligation unless
he or she determines opposing counsel sent the document “inadver-
tently.”58  In the remaining ten states, no professional conduct rule
addresses the recipient’s ethical obligations.  Regardless of whether a
state has or has not adopted an inadvertent disclosure rule, recipients
of inadvertent disclosure should research the jurisdiction’s ethics
opinions and case law that may provide additional authority, conflict-
ing authority, or the only authority regarding counsel’s obligations.59
receives any writing that appears “on its face . . . to be subject to the attorney-client privi-
lege or otherwise confidential, under circumstances where it is clear that the writing was
not intended for the receiving lawyer, shall refrain from examining the writing, promptly
notify the sending lawyer, and return the writing”); ME. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
4.4(b) (2009) (explaining that “a lawyer who receives a writing and has reasonable cause to
believe the writing may have been inadvertently disclosed and contain confidential infor-
mation or be subject to a claim of privilege or of protection as trial preparation material”
means that the lawyer “(1) shall not read the writing or, if he or she has begun to do so,
shall stop reading the writing; (2) shall notify the sender of the receipt of the writing; and
(3) shall promptly return, destroy or sequester the specified information and any copies”;
furthermore, “[t]he recipient may not use or disclose the information in the writing until
the claim is resolved, formally or informally,” and “[t]he sending or receiving lawyer may
promptly present the writing to a tribunal under seal for a determination of the claim”);
N.H. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2009) (“A lawyer who receives materials relating
to the representation of the lawyer’s client and knows that the material was inadvertently
sent shall promptly notify the sender and shall not examine the materials.  The receiving
lawyer shall abide by the sender’s instructions or seek determination by a tribunal.”); N.J.
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2009) (“A lawyer who receives a document and has
reasonable cause to believe that the document was inadvertently sent shall not read the
document or, if he or she has begun to do so, shall stop reading the document, promptly
notify the sender, and return the document to the sender.”); see also Petition of the Ten-
nessee Bar Association for the Adoption of Amended Tennessee Rules of Professional Con-
duct (May 13, 2009), available at http://www.tba.org/ethics/amends_051309/2009_rules_
petition_withallexhibits.pdf (explaining that proposed rule 4.4(b) would impose obliga-
tions beyond notice on recipients of inadvertent and unauthorized disclosures of confiden-
tial information).
58. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.  In Louisiana, the receiving lawyer’s R
duty is triggered by his or her determination that the document appears to be privileged or
otherwise confidential and was produced “under circumstances where it is clear that the
writing was not intended for the receiving lawyer.” LA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
4.4(b) (2008).  Maine’s rule is triggered by either the receiving attorney’s reasonable belief
that the document is subject to a claim of privilege or work product or the reasonable
belief the document was inadvertently disclosed. See ME. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
4.4(b) (2009).
59. Ethics opinions concerning receiving counsel’s obligations fall into one of four
categories.  The first category requires only that a receiving attorney give notice. See, e.g.,
Or. State Bar Bd. of Governors, Formal Op. 2005-150 (2005); Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. on
Legal Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 2007-200 (2007); Utah State Bar Ethics
Advisory Opinion Comm., Op. 99-01 (1999).  The second category imposes obligations
that are similar to or identical to those found in ABA Formal Opinion 92-368. See, e.g., Ky.
Bar Ass’n, Op. KBA E-374 (1995); Md. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Ethics, Op. 2000-04
(2000); N.Y. County Lawyers’ Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 730 (2002); Ass’n
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Finally, attorneys should proceed with caution when practicing in a
jurisdiction that has not definitively addressed the issue,60 as their case
may be the one in which the jurisdiction announces its expectations
for counsel.61
B. Professional Conduct Obligations of Recipients of Confidential
Information Embedded in Metadata
Metadata adds an additional wrinkle to these professional con-
duct questions.62  Some common metadata examples include informa-
tion regarding the author, the time a document was last saved,
redlining showing revisions by specific authors, and embedded com-
of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l and Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 2003–04
(2003); N.C. State Bar, Op. 252 (1997); Sup. Ct. of Tenn. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility,
Formal Op. 2004-F-150 (2004); Va. State Bar Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 1702
(1997).  The third category does not impose any ethical duty on the receiving attorney.
See, e.g., Alaska Bar Ass’n, Op. 97-1 (1997); Mass. Bar Ass’n, Op. 99-4 (1999) (explaining
that the committee does not answer a question it was not asked, which is whether receiving
counsel is obligated to inform sending counsel that he had received and read the letter).
The fourth category distinguishes between duties depending on whether the receiving
counsel knew that the document was inadvertently disclosed prior to reading it or the
receiving attorney learned the document was privileged or work product protected after
reading it. See, e.g., Colo. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 108 (2000); D.C. Bar Legal Ethics
Comm., Op. 341 (2007); Ill. State Bar Ass’n Advisory Op. on Prof’l Conduct, Op. 98-04
(1999).
60. For example, in an ethics opinion concerning metadata, West Virginia cautioned
that review and use of an opponent’s privileged information, including privileged informa-
tion in metadata, “could be” a violation of its Rule 8.4(c)—which prohibits “conduct in-
volving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation”—if the lawyer knows the
information was inadvertently sent.  W. Va. Lawyer Disciplinary Bd., Op. 2009-01 (2009).
61. See Lawrence K. Hellman, When “Ethics Rules” Don’t Mean What They Say: The Implica-
tions of Strained ABA Ethics Opinions, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 317, 330–31 (1996) (“Because
ABA opinions are sometimes followed and sometimes rejected by state authorities, lawyers
in a particular jurisdiction cannot know whether to rely on a published ABA opinion until
the subject that it addresses is taken up by that state’s ethics committee or the courts of
that state.”).
62. This Article defines metadata as encompassing all forms of data that may be em-
bedded in electronically stored information.  In the strictest sense, though, metadata is
“data about data,” which includes information such as who edited a document, how many
times a document has been opened and closed, and how many minutes a document was
left open.  Hricik, supra note 25, at 81, 84.  Additional types of embedded information R
would include information about the following functions used in Microsoft Word, a word
processing program: Track Changes, Fast Saves, Comments, and Versions. Id. at 85–86; see
also Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 646 (D. Kan. 2005) (defining
metadata); THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE GLOSSARY: E-DISCOVERY &
DIGITAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 33 (Conor R. Crowley et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007) (defin-
ing metadata as describing “how, when and by whom [electronically stored information]
was collected, created, accessed, modified and how it is formatted” and defining seven
other “metadata” terms).
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ments.63  Metadata may contain facts relevant to matters in dispute in
litigation;64 thus, discovery requests may properly encompass requests
for metadata.65  Metadata may also reveal confidential communica-
tions between attorney and client.66  Confidential metadata may be
revealed in two contexts: (1) in documents that are produced in dis-
covery; and (2) in other communications between opposing attorneys
in the current matter—such as when they exchange draft settlement
proposals in litigation or as they negotiate a contract for a proposed
transaction.67
The disclosure of confidential metadata raises professional con-
duct issues for sending and receiving attorneys.  Model Rule 1.6(a)
requires an attorney to protect confidential information,68 and com-
ments to the rule generally discuss the need to act “competently” to
protect confidences and to take “reasonable precautions” to prevent
confidences from being disclosed when “transmitting a communica-
63. See Hricik, supra note 25, at 84–86; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Re- R
sponsibility, Formal Op. 06-442 (2006) [hereinafter ABA Formal Op. 06-442].
64. See Aguilar v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement Div., 255 F.R.D. 350, 359–63
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (balancing the cost of production of various documents’ metadata against
the possible benefit in determining whether to require production); ABA Formal Op. 06-
442, supra note 63, at 3 (“[W]hen a party to a lawsuit is attempting to establish ‘who knew R
what when,’ the date and time that a critical document was created or who drafted it may
be a critical piece of information.”); see also Thomas Spahn, Metadata: A Case Study in the
Nature of Ethics Rules, EXPERIENCE, Summer 2007, at 44, 44 (discussing how the Wichita,
Kansas, police were able to learn the identity of the “BTK Killer” by reviewing the metadata
of a document sent by the serial killer).
65. Metadata is discoverable and often requested in litigation. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34
(allowing a party to serve a request on another party to “inspect, copy, test, or sample any
designated documents or electronically stored information—including . . . data or data
compilations stored in any medium from which information can be obtained”); Paul W.
Grimm, Ethical Issues Associated with Preserving, Accessing, Discovering, and Using Electronically
Stored Information, SP003 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 693, 695, 719–24 (2008) (noting that under FED. R.
CIV. P. 34, lawyers can request information be produced in “native format,” which would
include metadata, and also urging attorneys who scrub metadata from electronically stored
information in discovery, such as when the information has not been requested in native
format, to inform opposing counsel and to maintain a copy of the electronically stored
information with the metadata).  For information regarding a producing party’s obliga-
tions in this regard and best practices, see THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 62, at R
60–66.
66. See ABA Formal Op. 06-442, supra note 63, at 3 (“If a payment amount is being R
negotiated, then a redlined change or a comment in a draft agreement that suggests how
much more the opposing party is willing to pay or how much less they might take likely is
of the highest importance.”).
67. See, e.g., Hricik, supra note 25, at 80 n.8, 82.  Professor Hricik discusses an example R
where an attorney who searched for embedded information in a contract he was negotiat-
ing with opposing counsel was able to use Microsoft Word and a few clicks of the mouse to
find comments from business people on the other side to their counsel regarding contract
terms, negotiating positions, and bottom lines. Id. at 82.
68. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2009).
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tion.”69  The comments do not specifically address an issue that is con-
fusing to many attorneys, that issue being how to prevent disclosure of
confidences in metadata.70
In twelve jurisdictions, ethics opinions address a sending attor-
ney’s obligation to prevent disclosure of confidential information in
metadata.71  These opinions stress the need for attorneys to obtain
education, training, and professional assistance in removing
metadata,72 provide links to resources about metadata creation and
removal,73 and suggest methods that can be utilized to lessen the risk
of metadata disclosure.74  Similarly, in its Formal Opinion 06-442, the
ABA provides suggested methods for sending attorneys to use to avoid
metadata disclosure.75  While specific guidance is likely more helpful
69. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmts. 16–17 (2009).
70. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmts. (2009). See also Hricik,
supra note 25, at 91–92 (asserting that in 2005, many lawyers were still not aware of R
metadata; thus, a failure to prevent disclosure of confidences in 2005 may not have been a
breach of the duty of care).
71. Ala. State Bar Office of the Gen. Counsel, Op. RO-2007-02 (2007); Ariz. State Bar
Ethics Comm., Op. 07-03 (2007); Colo. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 119 (2008);
D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 341 (2007); Fla. Bar, Op. 06-2 (2006); Me. Prof’l Ethics
Comm’n of the Bd. of Overseers of the Bar, Op. 196 (2008); Md. State Bar Ass’n Comm.
on Ethics, Docket No. 2007-09 (2007); N.H. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 2008–2009/4
(2009); N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 782 (2004); Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm.
on Legal Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 2009-100 (2009); Vt. Bar Ass’n Prof’l
Responsibility Section, Op. 2009-1 (2009); W. Va. Lawyer Disciplinary Bd., Op. 2009-01
(2009).
72. See, e.g., Colo. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 119 (2008) (noting that it may
be appropriate to retain persons with expertise in computer software and hardware to set
up systems to control or prevent transmission of metadata); D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm.,
Op. 341 (2007) (“[L]awyers must either acquire sufficient understanding of the software
that they use or ensure that their office employs safeguards to minimize the risk of inadver-
tent disclosures.”); Fla. Bar, Op. 06-2 (2006) (noting that the duty to protect confidential
client information in metadata “may necessitate a lawyer’s continuing training and educa-
tion in the use of technology”).
73. See, e.g., D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 341 n.2 (2007); Fla. Bar, Op. 06-2 n.2
(2006); N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 782 n.2 (2004).
74. See, e.g., Colo. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 119 (2008) (suggesting that
attorneys scrub metadata, print documents in circumstances where it is vital that no
metadata be transmitted, and avoid redline or hidden comments); N.H. Bar Ass’n Ethics
Comm., Op. 2008–2009/4 (2009) (asserting that lawyers do not have to purchase software
to scrub metadata from documents, but may instead take steps to avoid creating metadata,
delete metadata, or send a hard copy, faxed, or scanned version of a document); W. Va.
Lawyer Disciplinary Bd., Op. 2009-01 (2009) (explaining methods to protect confidences
in metadata, including sending hard copies, sending only images through scanning or cre-
ating a Portable Document Format file, faxing, and using software programs to scrub
metadata).
75. ABA Formal Op. 06-442, supra note 63, at 4–5 (suggesting that counsel could avoid R
creating metadata, delete metadata—such as comments in a document—scrub metadata
from documents, transmit hard copy, facsimile, or scanned image versions of documents,
or enter a confidentiality agreement).
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for less technology-savvy attorneys, some of the ethics opinion advice
may be of questionable utility.  For example, some opinions en-
courage attorneys to avoid creating metadata, remove metadata them-
selves, or convert documents to a Portable Document Format (“PDF”)
file.76  It is almost certain, however, that attorneys often fail in at-
tempts to avoid creating metadata or in efforts to remove it manu-
ally.77  Further, many forms of metadata are not removed by
conversion to PDF.78  While it may be helpful to provide links to infor-
mation about software programs that can remove metadata (such as
software programs that scrub metadata), many jurisdictions are hesi-
tant to do so for fear that the references will become dated.79
Another question is the professional obligations of an attorney
who receives an opponent’s confidential metadata.  In its Formal
Opinion 06-442, the ABA opines that the issue of inadvertent disclo-
sure may be relevant to deciding a recipient’s duties upon receipt of
confidential metadata.80  The opinion refuses to characterize the
transmission of confidential metadata as inadvertent, however, ex-
plaining that the question of inadvertence “may be fact specific.”81
ABA Formal Opinion 06-442 further provides that even if the
metadata disclosure is inadvertent, the receiving attorney’s only obli-
gation under Model Rule 4.4(b) is to notify sending counsel that the
information was sent.82  With no other professional conduct rule
76. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. R
77. See Hricik, supra note 25, at 91 (explaining an example where an attorney either R
creates a file without knowing it contains metadata or tries but fails to remove metadata);
id. at 91–92 (noting that after speaking to nearly one thousand attorneys, it was “apparent
that the vast majority had never heard of embedded data, let alone how to avoid creating it
or how to remove it”); Adam K. Israel, Note, To Scrub or Not to Scrub: The Ethical Implications
of Metadata and Electronic Data Creation, Exchange, and Discovery, 60 ALA. L. REV. 469, 474–75
(2009) (observing the “potential for oversight or user error” associated with do-it-yourself
metadata removal techniques).
78. See Hricik, supra note 25, at 88–89 (explaining that document images, such as Port- R
able Document Format, saved as “.pdf” files, and Rich Text Format, saved as “.rtf” files, may
still contain metadata); Israel, supra note 77, at 473–74 (listing numerous categories of R
metadata that may still be contained in PDF files).
79. Colo. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 119 n.1 (2008) (noting that any primer
on controlling metadata would become obsolete almost immediately and would not be
included in the ethics opinion).
80. ABA Formal Op. 06-442, supra note 63, at 3. R
81. Id. at 3 n.7. The opinion further states the following:
Whether the receiving lawyer knows or reasonably should know that opposing
counsel’s sending, producing, or otherwise making available an electronic docu-
ment that contains metadata was “inadvertent” within the meaning of Rule
4.4(b), and is thereby obligated to provide notice of its receipt to the sender, is a
subject that is outside the scope of this opinion.
Id. at 4.
82. Id. at 3.
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prohibiting review and use of confidential metadata, the ABA observes
that the receiving attorney would thus be permitted to review and use
the information.83
Only one state’s professional conduct rule explicitly addresses the
obligations of a recipient of confidential metadata.  Comments to
Maine’s recently adopted Rule 4.4(b) provide that confidential
metadata “may be deemed to be inadvertently disclosed, and thus sub-
ject to [the protections of Rule 4.4(b)].”84  Six jurisdictions have
adopted ethics opinions that allow a receiving attorney to search an
opponent’s metadata, though five of these impose additional obliga-
tions if the recipient determines the information was sent inadver-
tently.85  Opinions in six states prohibit any review of an opponent’s
metadata.86
83. See id.
84. ME. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 4 (2009). But cf. Me. Prof’l Ethics
Comm’n of the Bd. of Overseers of the Bar, Op. 196 (2008) (prohibiting receiving attorney
from searching an opponent’s metadata in an effort to find confidential information).
85. Colo. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 119 (2008) (allowing a receiving attor-
ney to review metadata, but requiring the receiving attorney to presume that any confiden-
tial information was inadvertently sent, which triggers an obligation of notice to the
sending attorney under the state’s version of Model Rule 4.4(b)); D.C. Bar Legal Ethics
Comm., Op. 341 (2007) (permitting the review of metadata unless the recipient “has actual
knowledge that the metadata was inadvertently sent”); Md. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Eth-
ics, Docket No. 2007-09 (2007) (“Subject to any legal standards or requirements . . . this
Committee believes that there is no ethical violation if the recipient attorney . . . reviews or
makes use of the metadata without first ascertaining whether the sender intended to in-
clude such metadata.”); Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility,
Formal Op. 2009-100 (2009) (allowing review and use of an opponent’s metadata, but
noting that if the receiving lawyer determines the disclosure was inadvertent, notice is re-
quired under the state’s Rule 4.4(b)); Vt. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Responsibility Section, Op. 2009-
1 (2009) (opining that lawyers are not prohibited from reviewing opponent’s metadata but
reminding attorneys that they must notify the sender if they know or reasonably should
know the document was inadvertently disclosed); W. Va. Lawyer Disciplinary Bd., Op. 2009-
01 (2009) (opining that if an attorney has “actual knowledge” that the metadata was inad-
vertently sent, the attorney should consult with the sending lawyer before reviewing the
metadata and adding that it is “always safer to notify the sender before searching electronic
documents for metadata”).
86. Ala. State Bar Office of the Gen. Counsel, Op. RO-2007-02 (2007) (opining that
the unauthorized deliberate search for metadata by a receiving attorney is prohibited);
Ariz. State Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 07-03 (2007) (prohibiting searching metadata unless
authorized to do so by law, rule, order, or court procedure, but providing that if an attor-
ney innocently or inadvertently discovers metadata that the attorney knows or reasonably
should know is confidential or privileged, he or she must notify the sender and “preserve
the status quo for a reasonable period of time”); Fla. Bar, Op. 06-2 (2006) (providing that a
recipient of an electronic document must not try to review that document’s metadata, but
if the lawyer inadvertently does so, then he or she must promptly notify the sender); Me.
Prof’l Ethics Comm’n of the Bd. of Overseers of the Bar, Op. 196 (2008) (“[W]e find that
an attorney may not ethically take steps to uncover metadata, embedded in an electronic
document sent by counsel for another party, in an effort to detect information that is
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III. OTHER SOURCES OF LAW ADDRESSING INADVERTENT DISCLOSURE,
INCLUDING RECENT AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
The law of privilege waiver is the key doctrine used to address the
consequences of inadvertent disclosure.  The question of waiver is not
focused solely on a document’s admissibility at trial and is rarely re-
served until the eve of trial.  Rather, sending attorneys seek a waiver
ruling to regain control of the document, to prevent adverse use, and
to request other relief.87  Historically, federal and state courts have
followed one of three tests to determine if an unintentional disclosure
legally confidential and is or should be reasonably known not to have been intentionally
communicated.”); N.H. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 2008–2009/4 (2009) (“Receiving
lawyers have an ethical obligation not to search for, review, or use metadata . . . .  Receiving
lawyers necessarily know that any confidential information contained in the electronic ma-
terial is inadvertently sent, triggering the obligation under Rule 4.4(b) not to examine the
material.”); N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 749 (2001) (prohibiting the
use of computer technology to “surreptitiously ‘get behind’ visible documents” because the
data may contain attorney-client privileged or work product protected information); see
also N.Y. County Lawyers’ Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 738 (2008) (“A lawyer who
receives from an adversary electronic documents that appear to contain inadvertently pro-
duced metadata is ethically obligated to avoid searching the metadata in those
documents.”).
87. See, e.g., Kumar v. Hilton Hotels Corp., No. 08-2689, 2009 WL 1683479, at *1 (W.D.
Tenn. June 16, 2009) (granting Hilton’s “Emergency Motion for Return of Privileged Doc-
uments and Non-Waiver of Privilege”); Figueras v. P.R. Elec. Power Auth., 250 F.R.D. 94, 95
(D.P.R. 2008) (describing case in which disclosing party sought protective order directing
receiving party to “return the inadvertently disclosed document” and prohibiting receiving
party from “inquiring into matters discussed in the document”); Transp. Equip. Sales
Corp. v. BMY Wheeled Vehicles, 930 F. Supp. 1187, 1188–89 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (finding
privilege was not waived and ordering the receiving party to not use the document, to
provide a copy of the order to all recipients of the document, and to file with the court a
description of efforts made to ensure no improper use of document); Resolution Trust
Corp. v. First of Am. Bank, 868 F. Supp. 217, 218, 221 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (requiring, upon
a motion for a protective order, plaintiff’s counsel to destroy a confidential seven page
letter that an assistant at defendant’s law firm accidentally mailed to plaintiff’s counsel); In
re Kent County Adequate Pub. Facilities Ordinances Litig., No. 2921–VCN, 2008 WL
1851790, at *5–*6 (Del. Ch. Apr. 18, 2008) (ruling during discovery phase of case that
inadvertent disclosure did not result in waiver and that privileged documents must be re-
turned to disclosing party); Atlas Air, Inc. v. Greenberg Taurig, P.A., 997 So. 2d 1117,
1118–19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (disqualifying law firm when one of its attorneys re-
viewed opposing counsel’s privileged documents that were inadvertently delivered to the
firm by a third party contractor hired to copy and produce documents); Campbell v. Aero-
space Prods. Int’l, 830 N.Y.S.2d 416, 417 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (affirming trial court’s grant
of plaintiffs’ motion for protective order directing defendants to return inadvertently dis-
closed document on ground that it was privileged); see also John T. Hundley, “Inadvertent
Waiver” of Evidentiary Privileges: Can Reformulating the Issue Lead to More Sensible Decisions?, 19
S. ILL. U. L.J. 263, 281 & n.78 (1995) (citing cases in which courts, finding no waiver by
inadvertent disclosure, entered rulings that attempted to “‘put the genie back into the
bottle’ of confidentiality from which she sprang”).
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of privileged information results in waiver.88  In jurisdictions that fol-
low the “strict” approach, any disclosure of confidential information
waives the privilege.89  Jurisdictions following the “lenient” approach
find no waiver for any disclosure when the client did not intend to
waive the privilege.90  Finally, the most popular test is the “balancing”
approach, also known as the “modern” or “middle” approach.  Juris-
dictions applying this approach consider the following five factors to
determine waiver: “(1) the reasonableness of the precautions to pre-
vent inadvertent disclosure; (2) the time taken to rectify the error; (3)
the scope of the discovery; (4) the extent of the disclosure; and (5)
the ‘overriding issue of fairness.’”91  While many consider the balanc-
ing test the fairest approach,92 the standard creates substantial uncer-
tainty regarding whether a court will ultimately determine that a
particular disclosure waived the privilege.93
88. In addressing the consequences of inadvertent disclosure, many courts have ana-
lyzed work product waiver under the same rubric as privilege waiver. See EDNA SELAN EP-
STEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE 1086–87 (Am.
Bar Ass’n ed., 5th ed. 2007) (citing Fleet Nat’l Bank v. Tonneson & Co., 150 F.R.D. 10, 11
(D. Mass. 1993)); 6 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.70(6)(c) (3d
ed. 2009).  In other courts, waiver of work product protection is found if an inadvertent
disclosure creates a significant likelihood that an adversary will obtain the information.
See, e.g., Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Under Armour, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 761, 764, 772–73 (D. Md.
2008) (finding work product waiver where work product was “inadvertently” posted on a
website, because the disclosure created a significant likelihood that an adversary would
obtain the information). But see Nutramax Labs., Inc. v. Twin Labs. Inc., 183 F.R.D. 458,
464 n.10 (D. Md. 1998) (“The work product doctrine . . . is both broader and more robust
than the attorney client privilege, as it does not appear that it can be waived by inadvertent
disclosure in the same way that the attorney client privilege can.”).  With the enactment of
Federal Rule of Evidence 502, federal courts are required to apply the same test to deter-
mine waiver for inadvertent disclosure of work product as for inadvertent disclosure of
attorney-client privileged information. FED. R. EVID. 502(b).
89. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Fed. Deposit Ins.
Corp. v. Singh, 140 F.R.D. 252, 253 (D. Me. 1992).
90. See, e.g., Stratagem Dev. Corp. v. Heron Int’l N.V., 153 F.R.D. 535, 543–44 (S.D.N.Y.
1994); Mendenhall v. Barber-Green Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 955 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
91. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 109 F.R.D. 323, 332 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (quoting
and applying the five elements used in Lois Sportswear U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 104
F.R.D. 103, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), to support a holding of waiver).
92. See, e.g., Hydraflow, Inc. v. Enidine Inc., 145 F.R.D. 626, 637 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) (“To
the extent that fairness is also a value, the approach taken by federal courts [applying the
balancing test] . . . is, for that reason, preferred.”).
93. See Corey v. Norman, Hanson & Detroy, 742 A.2d 933, 942 (Me. 1999) (agreeing
with criticism that the balancing approach “creat[es] an uncertain, unpredictable privi-
lege, dependent on the proof of too many factors concerning the adequacy of the steps
taken to prevent disclosure”); Julie Cohen, Note, Look Before You Leap: A Guide to the Law of
Inadvertent Disclosure of Privileged Information in the Era of E-Discovery, 93 IOWA L. REV. 627,
637–40 (2008) (comparing two applications of the balancing test from different courts to
show the inconsistencies and unpredictability of the test).
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An inadvertent disclosure can have consequences beyond waiver
for a single document.  A court may rule that the disclosure results in
privilege waiver for all documents concerning the same subject mat-
ter.94  Further, a court could find that an inadvertent disclosure made
under a nonwaiver agreement may result in waiver in unrelated litiga-
tion against third parties.95  These concerns have led to costly pre-
production privilege review that still may not detect every privileged
document.96  Further, the volume of information and discovery sched-
ule in some cases can make a document-by-document pre-production
privilege review impossible97 or impractical.98
The risk of waiver under various sources of law applied by federal
courts and the high cost of avoiding waiver were of primary concern
for the committees that recommended changes to the Federal Rules
94. See In re EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (applying
waiver of privilege to all attorney-client communications relating to the subject matter in
the context of an advice-of-counsel defense); Texaco P.R., Inc. v. Dept. of Consumer Af-
fairs, 60 F.3d 867, 883–84 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding that the disclosure of “four carelessly
unveiled documents” relating to the same topic as fourteen other documents in the same
group constituted waiver as to all eighteen disclosures); see also Hundley, supra note 87, at R
280 n.76 (citing cases where an inadvertent disclosure resulted in subject matter waiver).
For work product, subject matter waiver is less likely to result from a single disclosure,
inadvertent or otherwise. See Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Under Armour, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 761,
773–74 (D. Md. 2008) (citing various authorities for the proposition that neither inten-
tional nor inadvertent disclosure of work product will necessarily result in subject matter
waiver).
95. See, e.g., Hopson v. Mayor of Balt., 232 F.R.D. 228, 235 (D. Md. 2005) (discussing
risk of waiver in a subsequent case against a different party, even when parties in prior case
agreed that inadvertent disclosure would not result in waiver).
96. See FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note (explaining that the Rule’s second
purpose is to “respond[ ] to the widespread complaint that litigation costs necessary to
protect against waiver of attorney-client privilege or work product have become prohibitive
due to the concern that any disclosure . . . will operate as a subject matter waiver”).
97. See, e.g., Paul & Baron, supra note 19, at 13.  The authors explain the following: R
Take then, for example, litigation in which the universe subject to search stands
at one billion e-mail records, at least 25% of which have one or more attachments
of varying length (1 to 300 pages).  Generously assume further that a model “re-
viewer” (junior lawyer, legal assistant, or contract professional) is able to review
an average of fifty e-mails, including attachments, per hour.  Without employing
any automated computer process to generate potentially responsive documents,
the review effort for this litigation would take 100 people, working ten hours a
day, seven days a week, fifty-two weeks a year, over fifty-four years to complete.
Id. (footnote call numbers omitted).
98. See, e.g., Hopson, 232 F.R.D. at 244 (explaining that in a case with millions of docu-
ments, a “record-by-record pre-production privilege review, on pain of subject matter
waiver, would impose upon parties costs of production that bear no proportionality to what
is at stake in the litigation”); see also John M. Facciola, Sailing on Confused Seas: Privilege
Waiver and the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2 FED. CTS. L. REV. 57, 59 (2007) (explain-
ing that the high cost of pre-production privilege review “threatens to make the federal
courts the exclusive litigation playground of the super rich”).
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of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”)99 and the Federal Rules of Evidence
(“FRE”).100  In 2006, the federal civil procedure rules were amended
to encourage litigants to agree on the consequences of producing,
intentionally or unintentionally, a client’s privileged or work product
protected information.  In Rule 26(f), attorneys are urged to agree on
a procedure to assert claims of privilege after production of docu-
ments; these agreements are referred to in this Article as “Privilege
Disclosure Agreements” because they allow the parties to agree on the
consequences of privileged document disclosure.101  Committee notes
explaining the amendments describe one such agreement as a
“clawback agreement,” which is an agreement that if a party discloses
a privileged document without intent to waive the privilege, then the
party may request the document’s return without waiver.102  The notes
99. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5) advisory committee’s note on 2006 amendment (“The
Committee has repeatedly been advised that the risk of privilege waiver, and the work
necessary to avoid it, add to the costs and delay of discovery.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) advi-
sory committee’s note on 2006 amendment (“Efforts to avoid the risk of waiver can impose
substantial costs on the party producing the material and the time required for the privi-
lege review can substantially delay access for the party seeking discovery.”).
100. FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note (explaining two purposes for the Rule:
(1) to resolve longstanding disputes about whether inadvertent disclosure results in waiver;
and (2) to address prohibitive costs associated with pre-production privilege review needed
to avoid subject matter waiver); S. REP. NO. 110-264, at 1–2 (2008) (“Outdated law affecting
inadvertent disclosure coupled with the stark increase in discovery materials has led to
dramatic litigation cost increases.”); see also Kenneth S. Broun & Daniel J. Capra, Getting
Control of Waiver of Privilege in the Federal Courts: A Proposal for a Federal Rule of Evidence 502, 58
S.C. L. REV. 211, 240 (2006).  Professors Broun and Capra argue that a congressional en-
actment is necessary:
If a statute or rule governing inadvertent waiver, scope of waiver, and selective
waiver of an evidentiary privilege is to effectively eliminate the need for unneces-
sarily burdensome document review and rulings on privilege in mass document
cases, then the provision must be binding on all persons, whether or not they are
parties to the litigation in which the disclosure takes place, and in all courts, state
and federal.
Id.
101. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3)(D) (providing that the discovery plan must contain the
parties’ views and proposals on “any issues about claims of privilege or of protection as
trial-preparation materials, including—if the parties agree on a procedure to assert these
claims after production—whether to ask the court to include their agreement in an
order”).
102. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) advisory committee’s note on 2006 amendment; see also FED. R.
CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s note on 2006 amendment (referring to and describing
clawback agreements, though not by name); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D.
280, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“[M]any parties to document-intensive litigation enter into so-
called ‘claw-back’ agreements that allow the parties to forego privilege review altogether in
favor of an agreement to return inadvertently produced privileged documents.”); THE
SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 62, at 8 (defining “clawback agreement” as “[a]n agree- R
ment outlining procedures to be followed to protect against waiver of privilege or work
product protection due to inadvertent production of documents or data”).
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also describe a “quick peek” agreement as one that contemplates in-
tentional disclosure of privileged documents—disclosure without pre-
production privilege review—under an agreement that the quick peek
does not waive the privilege.103  The rules also provide that federal
courts may enter orders implementing these agreements; this Article
terms these orders “Privilege Disclosure Orders.”104
Further, FRCP 26(b)(5)(B) provides that if a party discloses a
document in discovery and wishes to assert that the document is privi-
leged or protected as trial-preparation material, the party should no-
tify the recipient and explain the basis of the privilege claim.105  The
rule directs the recipient of such notice to “return, sequester, or de-
stroy” the information, to retrieve information that has already been
disseminated, and to not use or disclose the information.106  The re-
ceiving party may submit the sequestered document to the court for a
determination of whether the information is privileged, and the pro-
ducing party must preserve the information until the claim is
resolved.107
On September 19, 2008, FRE 502 was enacted.108  FRE 502(b)
provides that a disclosure does not waive the privilege if three stan-
dards are satisfied: “(1) the disclosure is inadvertent; (2) the holder of
103. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) advisory committee’s note on 2006 amendment; see also FED. R.
CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s note on 2006 amendment (referring to and describing
quick peek agreements without officially referring to them as such); THE SEDONA CONFER-
ENCE, supra note 62, at 42 (defining “quick peek” as “[a] production whereby documents R
and/or [electronically stored information] are made available to the opposing party
before being reviewed for privilege, confidentiality or privacy, requiring stringent guide-
lines and restrictions to prevent waiver”).
104. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iv) (providing that a scheduling order may include
party agreements for asserting claims of privilege or work product protection after infor-
mation is produced).  Such orders and related party agreements are given various names
by courts, commentators, and rulemakers; they may be referred to as nonwaiver agree-
ments, inadvertent disclosure agreements, confidentiality orders, and “502(d) orders,” or
they may be referenced in terms of a broader order in which they are incorporated, such as
a “scheduling order” or a “protective order.” See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(1) (“scheduling
order”); FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note (“confidentiality orders”); Alcon Mfg.,
Ltd. v. Apotex Inc., No. 1:06-cv-1642-RLY-TAB, 2008 WL 5070465, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 26,
2008) (“protective order”); Henry S. Noyes, Federal Rule of Evidence 502: Stirring the State Law
of Privilege and Professional Responsibility with a Federal Stick, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 673,
687–88, 735 (2009) (“nonwaiver agreement” and “502(d) order”); Paul & Baron, supra
note 19, at 37 (“inadvertent disclosure agreement”). R
105. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B).  Under the heading “Information Produced,” the rule
provides the following: “If information produced in discovery is subject to a claim of privi-
lege or of protection as trial-preparation material, the party making the claim may notify
any party that received the information of the claim and the basis for it.”  Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. FED. R. EVID. 502.
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the privilege . . . took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure; and (3)
the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error, includ-
ing (if applicable) following Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(5)(B).”109  Like FRCP 26, the new FRE 502 contemplates that
litigants may enter Privilege Disclosure Agreements.110  When federal
courts enter Privilege Disclosure Orders consistent with these agree-
ments, or enter a Privilege Disclosure Order in the absence of such an
agreement, FRE 502(d) provides that the order is enforceable in sub-
sequent federal and state court proceedings.111  Subsection (c) of the
rule discusses the effect in federal court of privilege disclosures that
occur in state court.112
IV. APPLICATION OF THE VARIOUS SOURCES OF AUTHORITY
REGARDING INADVERTENT DISCLOSURE: ISSUES ADDRESSED
AND QUESTIONS THAT REMAIN
This Part synthesizes various sources of authority in order to con-
sider the implications of inadvertent disclosure in litigation, and then
in non-litigation matters.  Finally, this Part discusses the legal and pro-
fessional conduct issues surrounding disclosure and receipt of confi-
dential information in metadata.
109. FED. R. EVID. 502(b).
110. See FED. R. EVID. 502(e); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f).
111. FED. R. EVID. 502(d) (“Controlling effect of a court order.—A Federal court may
order that the privilege or protection is not waived by disclosure connected with the litiga-
tion pending before the court—in which event the disclosure is also not a waiver in any
other Federal or State proceeding.”); FED. R. EVID. 502(e) (“Controlling effect of a party
agreement.—An agreement on the effect of disclosure in a Federal proceeding is binding
only on the parties to the agreement, unless it is incorporated into a court order.” (emphasis
added)); see also FED. R. EVID. 502(d) advisory committee’s note (“[T]he court order may
provide for return of documents without waiver irrespective of the care taken by the dis-
closing party; the rule contemplates enforcement of ‘claw-back’ and ‘quick peek’ arrange-
ments as a way to avoid the excessive costs of pre-production review for privilege and work
product.”).  The terminology used in 502(d) is so broad that it may encompass many or-
ders other than what this Article terms Privilege Disclosure Orders. See, e.g., Whitaker
Chalk Swindle & Sawyer, LLP v. Dart Oil & Gas Corp., No. 4:08-CV-684-Y, 2009 WL 464989,
at *3–*5 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2009) (finding that although the defendant objected to pro-
ducing privileged documents, citing concern that privilege would be considered waived in
pending litigation in another court, the court ordered production and stated that privilege
would not be waived pursuant to FRE 502(d)).  Further, the language of 502(d) does not
ensure that all Privilege Disclosure Orders will prevent waiver in future litigation; thus, the
rule has a narrower application than many attorneys likely envision. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 125–41 (discussing the rule’s application to “post-disclosure orders”). R
112. FED. R. EVID. 502(c).
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A. Litigation Issues: The Continuing Possibility of Privilege Waiver and
Gaps in Protection for a Document Pending a Waiver
Determination
In litigation, an attorney who learns that he or she inadvertently
disclosed a document should have two questions.  First, what is the
likelihood that a court will find no waiver of the privilege, allowing the
court to order the document’s return and perhaps other relief?113
Second, prior to that waiver ruling, will my opponent protect the sta-
tus quo, that is, not disseminate or otherwise use the contents of the
document to my client’s disadvantage?
1. Continuing Threat of Waiver
While some have asserted that litigants have much greater protec-
tion against privilege waiver with the enactment of FRE 502,114 sub-
stantial risks of waiver remain.115  First, when there is no Privilege
Disclosure Agreement or Order, the applicable law is FRE 502(b).116
That rule essentially adopts the “balancing” approach to determine
waiver.117  Thus the new FRE 502(b) approach incorporates the same
113. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (explaining that the waiver ruling is R
sought to obtain additional relief beyond a decision on admissibility).
114. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 110-264, at 3 (2008) (opining that because a Privilege Disclo-
sure Order is enforceable in later proceedings, the rule will “limit discovery costs by ensur-
ing that parties . . . will know they can rely on the new waiver rules in subsequent
proceedings”); Ashish Prasad & Vazantha Meyers, The Practical Implications of Proposed Rule
502, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 133, 139 (2007) (opining that under then-proposed FRE 502,
“[c]orporations will have a heightened ability to rely, even in state court, on agreements,
such as ‘clawback agreements,’ which become a part of court orders, and the management
of large-scale discovery should be less burdensome as a result”).
115. This Article presumes that FRE 502 is constitutional and will be enforced. See gener-
ally Noyes, supra note 104, at 700–42 (discussing whether Congress had authority to enact R
FRE 502 and whether the rule’s enforcement may violate the due process rights of persons
and entities).
116. FED. R. EVID. 502(b); see, e.g., Reckley v. City of Springfield, No. 3:05-cv-249, 2008
WL 5234356, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 12, 2008) (holding that under FRE 502(b), privilege
was not waived for inadvertently disclosed e-mail messages); B-Y Water Dist. v. City of Yank-
ton, No. CIV. 07-4142, 2008 WL 5188837, at *1–*2 (D.S.D. Dec. 10, 2008) (applying FRE
502(b) and determining that counsel’s disclosure of two privileged documents did not
result in waiver).
117. FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee’s note (explaining that “the rule opts for
the middle ground: inadvertent disclosure of protected communications . . . does not con-
stitute a waiver if the holder took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure and also promptly
took reasonable steps to rectify the error” and that “[t]he rule is flexible enough to accom-
modate any of [the five factors considered in balancing jurisdictions]”); see also Rhoads
Indus., Inc. v. Bldg. Materials Corp. of Am., 254 F.R.D. 216, 226–27 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (apply-
ing FRE 502(b) to determine privilege waiver and analyzing the facts of the case by consid-
ering the traditional five-factor balancing test).
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uncertainty and possibility of waiver that exists in balancing
jurisdictions.118
Second, contrary to popular misconception, orders entered
under FRE 502(d) do not foreclose the possibility of waiver.  The rule
contemplates that courts will enter orders regarding the conse-
quences of future disclosures of privileged information119—the Privi-
lege Disclosure Orders previously discussed120—that will be
enforceable in subsequent state and federal courts.121  This future-
looking Privilege Disclosure Order could provide, for example, that
“any disclosure of privileged or work product protected information
in this case does not result in privilege waiver.”122  But numerous au-
thorities have encouraged other formulations for Privilege Disclosure
Orders.123  As a result, it is likely that courts will continue to enter
orders that require the disclosing party to prove disclosure was “inad-
vertent,” to show that “prompt” action was taken to reclaim a disclosed
document, or to satisfy other requirements to avoid waiver.124
118. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. R
119. FED. R. EVID. 502(d) advisory committee’s note (“Confidentiality orders are becom-
ing increasingly important in limiting the costs of privilege review and retention . . . [and]
the rule contemplates enforcement of ‘claw-back’ and ‘quick peek’ arrangements as a way
to avoid the excessive costs of pre-production review for privilege and work product.”).
120. See supra text accompanying notes 104, 108–12. R
121. FED. R. EVID. 502(d); see also Paul & Baron, supra note 19, at 38 (stating that one R
purpose of FRE 502 was to make “court-endorsed ‘clawback’ type agreements enforceable
against third parties” (emphasis added)). But see supra note 111 (explaining that the lan- R
guage of the rule is so broad that it could encompass orders other than Privilege Disclo-
sure Orders).
122. See FED. R. EVID. 502(d) advisory committee’s note (“For example, the court order
may provide for return of documents without waiver irrespective of the care taken by the
disclosing party . . . .”).
123. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s note on 2006 amendment (while discuss-
ing party agreements that may be included in a court order, providing that “[parties] may
agree that if privileged or protected information is inadvertently produced, the producing
party may by timely notice assert the privilege or protection and obtain return of the materi-
als without waiver” (emphasis added)); THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES:
BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT
PRODUCTION 51 (Jonathan M. Redgrave et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007) (explaining that “the order
should provide that the inadvertent disclosure of a privileged or work product document does not
constitute a waiver of privilege, that the privileged document should be returned (or certifica-
tion that it has been deleted),” and finally that “any notes or copies discussing the privi-
leged or work product information will be destroyed or deleted” (emphasis added)); Moze
Cowper & John Rosenthal, Not Your Mother’s Rule 26(f) Conference Anymore, 8 SEDONA CONF.
J. 261, 267 (2007) (explaining that in a 26(f) conference, attorneys should discuss whether
they will agree to seek a court order “that the inadvertent production of [electronically stored
information] shall not constitute a waiver of privilege and, if so, under what circumstances
would constitute waiver” (emphasis added)).
124. See, e.g., Alcon Mfg., Ltd. v. Apotex Inc., No. 1:06-cv-1642-RLY-TAB, 2008 WL
5070465, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 26, 2008) (describing a court order providing that the “[in-
advertent] production shall not . . . constitute a waiver . . . provided that the producing
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The latter form of Privilege Disclosure Orders carries a risk of
waiver in the very court that enters the order.125  Even with a Privilege
Disclosure Order in place, a receiving attorney can, and likely will,
challenge a disclosure as waiving the privilege,126 and a court may find
the privilege waived.127  For ease of reference, this ruling will be
termed the “post-disclosure order.”  Nothing in FRE 502(d) prevents
party promptly makes a good-faith representation that such production was inadvertent or
mistaken and takes prompt remedial action to withdraw the disclosure upon its discov-
ery”); Amersham Biosciences Corp. v. PerkinElmer, Inc., No. 03-4901(JLL), 2007 WL
329290, at *1 n.1 (D.N.J. Jan. 31, 2007) (describing a court protective order that provided
that parties must make “best efforts” to identify privileged materials prior to disclosure and
if a party discovers that it has inadvertently produced a privileged document, it “shall
promptly give written notice to counsel for the receiving party”); VLT, Inc. v. Lucent
Techs., Inc., 54 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 1319, 1320 (D. Mass. 2003) (identifying agreement
providing that “[i]nadvertent production of documents subject to work product immunity
or the attorney-client privilege shall not constitute a waiver”); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Sandoz
Ltd., 916 F. Supp. 404, 406 n.2 (D.N.J. 1995) (identifying protective order providing that if
the parties are unable to agree upon a claim of inadvertent production, “the burden shall
be on the producing party . . . to establish its claim of privilege”); Steadfast Ins. Co. v.
Purdue Frederick Co., 40 Conn. L. Rptr. 370, 370 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2005) (describing
stipulated protective order providing for no waiver by inadvertent production “provided
that the producing party shall promptly notify the receiving party in writing of such inad-
vertent production,” and further providing for documents to be returned if “reasonably
prompt” notification was made).
125. This is ironic in that most commentary on the issue has focused on the risk of
waiver if the order is not enforced in a subsequent case—not the risk that its enforcement in
the court that entered the order may actually result in waiver. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 502(d)
advisory committee’s note (“[T]he utility of a confidentiality order in reducing discovery
costs is substantially diminished if it provides no protection outside the particular litigation in
which the order is entered.” (emphasis added)); THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 123, at R
54 (noting various risks of quick peek orders, including the risk that they may not be
enforced in subsequent cases without the enactment of FRE 502, but not mentioning
waiver risk in the case in which the order was originally entered).
126. See, e.g., In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 235 F.R.D. 407, 417–18 (N.D. Ill. 2006)
(describing facts where despite an agreement that the sending party could avoid waiver by
providing notification “within 30 days of the discovery” of an inadvertent disclosure, the
receiving attorney asserted waiver, arguing notice was more than thirty days after the send-
ing attorney’s “constructive knowledge” of disclosure); VLT, Inc., 54 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West)
at 1321–22 (holding that disclosure of a letter, which had even been produced in prior
litigation involving VLT, “could be considered recklessness, never mind grossly negligent”
and thus not “inadvertent” under the protective order); Prescient Partners, L.P. v. Field-
crest Cannon, Inc., No. 96Civ.7590(DAB)(JCF), 1997 WL 736726, at *1–*2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
26, 1997) (describing facts where despite a court order that inadvertent disclosures do not
result in waiver, receiving counsel argued that a paralegal’s mistaken production of privi-
leged documents that counsel had marked as privileged was not inadvertent); see also Bar-
rer, supra note 30, at 39 (suggesting that receiving counsel argue that disclosure resulted in R
waiver and stating that there is “no downside to seeking a [waiver] ruling”).
127. See, e.g., Ciba-Geigy Corp., 916 F. Supp. at 411–12 (concluding that the disclosing
party waived privilege by failing to undertake “reasonable precautions” to prevent disclo-
sure despite a court order providing that an “inadvertent disclosure” does not result in
waiver).
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the entry of a post-disclosure order finding waiver.128  As one of the
first cases to specifically reference FRE 502(d), Alcon Manufacturing,
Ltd. v. Apotex Inc. concerned a court’s future-looking Privilege Disclo-
sure Order.129  To avoid waiver for an inadvertent disclosure, the or-
der required a sending attorney to “promptly make[ ] a good-faith
representation that such production was inadvertent or mistaken and
take[ ] prompt remedial action to withdraw the disclosure upon its
discovery.”130  The defendant refused to return the document and
even provided the privileged document to its experts, arguing that the
plaintiff waived the privilege by not taking “prompt” action as re-
quired by the order.131  Citing FRE 502(d) and setting out the terms
of the order, the court determined that the plaintiff had complied
with the order, justifying a conclusion that the privilege was not
waived.132
The opposite result was reached in another post-FRE 502 case,
Relion, Inc. v. Hydra Fuel Cell Corp.133  In this case, the court entered a
Privilege Disclosure Order that provided in part the following: “Inad-
vertent production of documents or information subject to the attor-
ney-client privilege . . . shall not constitute a waiver . . . provided that
the producing party notifies the receiving party in writing promptly
after discovery of such inadvertent production.”134  Relion asserted
that it had inadvertently produced two privileged e-mail messages, de-
fendant ASRC refused to return them despite Relion’s written re-
quest, and ASRC had improperly attached the privileged documents
to a motion filed with the court.135  In response, ASRC argued that the
documents had not been inadvertently produced, relying on the fact
that Relion’s counsel had reviewed the documents prior to their pro-
128. See FED. R. EVID. 502(d).
129. 2008 WL 5070465, at *4.
130. Id.
131. Id. at *1, *5.
132. Id. at *4–*6.
133. No. CV06-607 HU, 2008 WL 5122828, at *3 (D. Or. Dec. 4, 2008).
134. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff Relion’s Motion to Enforce Stipulated
Protective Order Against Defendant ASRC at 3, Relion, Inc. v. Hydra Fuel Cell Corp., No.
06-cv-00607 HU, 2008 WL 5585057 (D. Or. Sept. 12, 2008).  The order further provided
the following:
Such inadvertently produced documents and all copies thereof shall promptly be
returned to the producing party upon request. No use shall be made of such docu-
ments other than to challenge the propriety of the asserted privilege, nor shall they be
shown to anyone who has not already been given access to them subsequent to
the request to return them.
Id.
135. Relion, 2008 WL 5122828, at *2.
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duction.136  In determining the appropriateness of waiver under the
Privilege Disclosure Order, the court discussed FRE 502(b) and con-
sidered whether Relion took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure
and promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the disclosure.137  Deter-
mining that it had not, the court found that the privilege was waived
and denied the motion to enforce the terms of the stipulated protec-
tive order.138
Under FRE 502(d), the Alcon court’s post-disclosure order find-
ing no waiver is binding in subsequent federal and state court pro-
ceedings,139 but what about the post-disclosure order finding waiver in
Relion?  Rule 502(d) only requires subsequent courts to enforce a fed-
eral court order that privilege is not waived by disclosure,140 so a subse-
quent court could allow Relion to re-assert the privilege.  But it is also
possible, and consistent with FRE 502(d), for a subsequent court to
find privilege was waived by the prior disclosure.141  In short, the Re-
lion Privilege Disclosure Order did not prevent a waiver ruling in that
case and it does not prevent a waiver ruling in a subsequent case.
Beyond these issues in federal courts, questions remain when a
disclosure occurs in a state court proceeding.  When parties enter
Privilege Disclosure Agreements and courts enter Privilege Disclosure
Orders, litigants face the same uncertainty as that faced in federal
court: The instant court may find the privilege was waived for non-
136. See Memorandum in Opposition to Relion’s Motion to Enforce Stipulated Protec-
tive Order Against Defendant ASRC at 2, Relion, Inc. v. Hydra Fuel Cell Corp., No. 06-cv-
00607 HU, 2008 WL 5585058 (D. Or. Sept. 24, 2008).
137. Relion, 2008 WL 5122828, at *2–*3.  The court did not refer to FRE 502(d) in its
discussion. See id.
138. Id. at *3–*4.
139. See FED. R. EVID. 502(d) (providing that a court “may order that the privilege or
protection is not waived by disclosure,” and that this order is binding in other federal and
state courts).
140. See id.; see also Broun & Capra, supra note 100, at 264 (asserting that FRE 502 de- R
prives third parties of the “opportunity to argue that a waiver occurred if the disclosure was in
accordance with the court’s order” (emphasis added)).
141. See, e.g., Genentech, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 122 F.3d 1409, 1418 (Fed.
Cir. 1997).  In Genentech, a pre-FRE 502(d) case, a court in a prior proceeding had found
privilege waiver because Genentech, the disclosing party, failed to establish that it had
complied with the terms of the protective order in the case. Id. at 1413.  In the subsequent
case, Genentech asserted that despite the finding of waiver in the prior case, the prior
court’s protective order protected against waiver in subsequent litigation. Id. at 1415–16.
The Federal Circuit disagreed, explaining that the prior court’s protective order only dealt
with the issue of whether inadvertent disclosure results in waiver, that inadvertent disclo-
sure did result in waiver in the prior case, and that it was not error to find waiver in the
subsequent case. Id. at 1417–18.
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compliance with the terms of the Privilege Disclosure Order.142  Fur-
ther, because FRE 502(d) does not require subsequent federal and
state courts to enforce Privilege Disclosure Orders entered by state
courts,143 attorneys practicing in state court must take care to craft an
order that a subsequent court will be inclined to enforce.144
2. Use of Privileged Information Prior to a Waiver Ruling
As the previous discussion illustrates, even after significant
changes to federal law, the possibility of waiver remains in both fed-
eral and state court proceedings.  And when receiving attorneys think
waiver is possible, they will be inclined to use the opponent’s docu-
ment145 unless they are specifically prohibited from doing so.  Such
142. See supra notes 126–27 and accompanying text; see also supra text accompanying R
notes 133–38. R
143. See FED. R. EVID. 502(d). The first draft of FRE 502 would have provided for uni-
form rules for subsequent state and federal courts to determine waiver regardless of
whether the initial disclosure was in federal or state court; however, that proposal was
abandoned. See FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note (discussing the committee’s
drafting choices); see also FED. R. EVID. 502(c) advisory committee’s note (asserting that
state confidentiality orders are not covered by the rule but that such an order “is enforcea-
ble” in federal courts under principles of “‘comity, courtesy, and . . . federalism’” (altera-
tion in original) (quoting Tucker v. Ohtsu Tire & Rubber Co., 191 F.R.D. 495, 499 (D. Md.
2000))). Though the advisory committee cites Tucker for the proposition that federalism
and comity constrain a federal court considering the enforceability of a state court order,
the Tucker court explained there is “less need for deference and comity when the order
involved is really an agreement by counsel approved, almost as a ministerial act, by the
court.” Tucker, 191 F.R.D. at 501; see also THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 123, at 52 R
(“There is no guarantee that a nonwaiver order in one jurisdiction will be fully honored in
another if protected information is disclosed.”).
144. See Tucker, 191 F.R.D. at 499–501 (noting factors that may influence a subsequent
court to enforce a prior court’s protective order).  Even if the state court order is not
enforced, it is still possible that waiver can be avoided under substantive law applied by the
court. See Hopson v. Mayor of Balt., 232 F.R.D. 228, 239–42 (D. Md. 2005) (explaining that
subsequent courts applying federal common law will not allow admission of privileged in-
formation that was erroneously compelled or provided by a party that did not have an
opportunity to claim the privilege, and discussing elements that should be included in an
order to protect the privilege in future litigation); supra text accompanying notes 90–91 R
(discussing the law of lenient and balancing jurisdictions, which, if applied, could result in
a finding of no waiver).
145. See, e.g., In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litig., 181 F.R.D. 680, 698 (N.D. Ga.
1998) (“If the disclosure operates to end legal protection for the information, the lawyer
may use it for the benefit of the lawyer’s own client and may be required to do so if that
would advance the client’s lawful objectives . . . .” (citation omitted)); Barrer, supra note
30, at 37 (“In reflecting upon the consequences of an inadvertent disclosure, a recipient R
should consider whether the disclosure: (a) is one that must be returned immediately with-
out further consideration; [or] (b) may be considered a waiver of a privilege and therefore usea-
ble . . . .” (emphasis added)); Michael J. DiLernia, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B)
and the Ethics of Inadvertent Disclosure, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 533, 540 (2007) (asserting
that “if the disclosure, despite its inadvertency, results or could result in the privilege being
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prohibitions could be contained in a Privilege Disclosure Agreement
or Order, professional conduct rules, or some other source of law.
As aforementioned, no such prohibition on use prior to a waiver
ruling is contained in Model Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4(b).146
No such prohibition is contained in FRE 502, either.147  Some protec-
tion in this regard is provided by FRCP 26(b)(5)(B), however.  For
privileged or work product protected documents produced in discov-
ery, the rule requires a receiving attorney to “return, sequester, or de-
stroy” a privileged document if sending counsel provides notice that
the privileged or work product protected document was produced
and, presumably, that the sending attorney wants the document
back.148  The rule also provides that after receiving notice, the receiv-
ing attorney may not use or disclose the document pending a waiver
determination and must retrieve information that has already been
disseminated.149  In these provisions, the rule protects the privilege to
an extent pending the waiver determination.  Notably, the receiving
attorney cannot ignore the request based on a belief that the disclo-
sure was not inadvertent.150
Despite this seemingly broad protection of the status quo pend-
ing a waiver ruling, there are several gaps.  First, FRCP 26(b)(5)(B)
provides no protection for documents disclosed outside of discovery—
such as a misdirected letter, facsimile, or e-mail sent in a non-discov-
ery context.  Such disclosures are often the subject of a waiver mo-
tion,151 but FRCP 26(b)(5)(B)’s protections do not apply because the
documents were not produced in discovery.152  Thus, even if a send-
ing attorney requests the return of a misdirected e-mail pending a
waiver ruling, the receiving attorney would not be in violation of
FRCP 26(b)(5)(B) if he or she ignored opposing counsel’s request.
The sending attorney may ultimately receive the court’s ruling that
waived, then the recipient would be able to use the documents—at least until the privilege
is affirmed—without facing any ethical conflicts”).
146. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2009).
147. See FED. R. EVID. 502; see also Noyes, supra note 104, at 749–50 (explaining that FRE R
502 “does not contemplate what courts and clients will do once a party’s secret information
is disclosed and used against them” and that the rule “does not contemplate what the
Receiving Party’s attorney will do once it receives privileged or work product protected
information”).
148. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B).
149. Id.
150. Id. But cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (requiring receiving attor-
ney to determine if the disclosure was “inadvertently sent”).
151. See supra note 31 (discussing non-discovery disclosures of confidential information R
and motions seeking a ruling on privilege waiver).
152. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B); see also DiLernia, supra note 145, at 545–46 (noting R
that FRCP 26(b)(5)(B) does not appear to apply in a non-discovery context).
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the privilege was not waived.  Nonetheless, the receiving attorney may
have reaped substantial rewards from disseminating the protected in-
formation in the meantime.
Second, the rule does not require the receiving attorney to take
any action unless and until informed of the disclosure by sending
counsel.153  This means the sending attorney must discover the mis-
take before the receiving attorney has any affirmative obligation to
protect the content of the document.  With the large volume of elec-
tronically stored information provided to opposing counsel in litiga-
tion, it is more likely for the receiving lawyer to review information
received and find a privileged document than for sending counsel to
re-review what was sent and discover a mistake.154  Nonetheless, in a
jurisdiction without a professional conduct rule, ethics opinion, or
other authority requiring the receiving attorney to provide notice to
the sending attorney,155 the receiving attorney would be free to use
the document.  Cases reflect that receiving attorneys often make sub-
stantial, strategic use of a document before sending counsel learns
what happened.156  Adding insult to injury, the sending attorney’s de-
lay in addressing the issue—even as receiving counsel used the fruits
of the inadvertent disclosure—may be relied upon by receiving coun-
153. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B).
154. This expectation is embodied in comments to the new Federal Rule of Evidence.
See FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee’s note (“The rule does not require the produc-
ing party to engage in a post-production review to determine whether any protected com-
munication or information has been produced by mistake.”).
155. See Fred C. Zacharias, Evidence Laws and Ethics Rules, 19 No. 2 PROF. LAW. 12, 15
(2009) (noting that Model Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4(b) “requires lawyers to bring
inadvertent disclosures to light, which in turn will instigate judicial resolution of the ques-
tion of whether the lawyers should return the documents”).
156. See, e.g., Koch Foods of Ala., LLC v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 303 F. App’x 841, 846
(11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that counsel had listed the document on the privilege log but
subsequently produced the document and learned of the production when opposing coun-
sel revealed it in a deposition); Am. Coal Sales Co. v. Nova Scotia Power Inc., No. 2:06-cv-
94, 2009 WL 467576, at *18 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 23, 2009) (noting that the sending counsel
discovered the disclosure of a privileged document when receiving counsel attempted to
use it at a deposition); B-Y Water Dist. v. City of Yankton, No. CIV. 07-4142, 2008 WL
5188837, at *1 (D.S.D. Dec. 10, 2008) (describing where sending counsel became aware
that he had disclosed privileged information when opposing counsel referenced docu-
ments in a deposition); Figueras v. P.R. Elec. Power Auth., 250 F.R.D. 94, 97 (D.P.R. 2008)
(explaining that sending counsel realized a privileged document was produced when re-
ceiving counsel used the privileged document as an exhibit in a deposition more than a
month after it was produced); Rico v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 171 P.3d 1092, 1095–96
(Cal. 2007) (describing where receiving counsel admitted that even though he knew send-
ing counsel did not intend to produce a document, he nonetheless copied it, studied it,
made notes on it, gave copies to co-counsel and experts, discussed the document with each
of his experts, and asked questions about the document in depositions of his opponents’
experts).
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sel in its argument for waiver.157  Even if a court ultimately finds that
the privilege was not waived, receiving counsel’s dissemination and
use of the information already may have caused irreparable harm.158
While disqualification might prevent further harm, some courts are
hesitant to disqualify when the receiving attorney did not violate a
rule of professional conduct or other law.159
Finally, while FRCP 26(b)(5)(B) requires counsel to file the doc-
ument under seal if a waiver determination is sought, the rule does
not specifically prohibit receiving attorneys from referencing the con-
tents of the document while seeking a waiver ruling.160  If attorneys
discuss the contents of an opponent’s document in court filings,161
the ultimate finding of “no waiver” loses some of its significance.
157. Under the terms of a Privilege Disclosure Agreement and related Order, such as
under FRE 502(d), the receiving attorney may attempt to assert that the sending party’s
delay in addressing the issue justifies waiver. See, e.g., Alcon Mfg., Ltd. v. Apotex Inc., No.
1:06-cv-1642-RLY-TAB, 2008 WL 5070465, at *5–*6 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 26, 2008) (noting where
receiving counsel argued—unsuccessfully—that “Plaintiffs cannot show that they promptly
took remedial action to withdraw the disclosure” under the terms of a protective order).
Alternatively, when no agreement or order is in place, the receiving attorney might success-
fully argue under FRE 502(b)(3) or comparable case law in balancing jurisdictions that the
sending attorney did not “promptly” take steps to rectify the error; thus, waiver is justified.
See, e.g., Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251, 263 (D. Md. 2008) (rea-
soning that, considering the time it took counsel to rectify error under the balancing test,
“it is noteworthy that the [sending party] did not discover the disclosure, but rather the
[receiving attorney] made the discovery”).
158. See, e.g., Alcon Mfg., Ltd., 2008 WL 5070465, at *5–*6 (finding that because sending
counsel complied with the terms of the Privilege Disclosure Order, privilege was not
waived even though receiving counsel had already asked questions about the disclosed
privileged document in two depositions and provided the document to its experts).
159. See, e.g., In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litig., 181 F.R.D. 680, 697–98 (N.D.
Ga. 1998) (finding that because ABA Formal Opinion 92-368 had not been adopted and
because a receiving attorney’s legal obligations are “not a matter of settled [waiver] law,”
receiving counsel would not be disqualified for using an inadvertently disclosed docu-
ment); Resolution Trust Co. v. First of Am. Bank, 868 F. Supp. 217, 219–21 (W.D. Mich.
1994) (applying ABA Formal Opinion 92-368 to determine that receiving counsel acted
unethically in reading a privileged letter, but concluding that disqualification was inappro-
priate in part because “precedent did not give clear directions to plaintiff’s attorneys”).
But see Rico, 171 P.3d at 1100 (disqualifying receiving counsel); Abamar Hous. & Dev., Inc.
v. Lisa Daly Lady Decor, Inc., 724 So. 2d 572, 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (disqualifying
the recipient of privileged documents from continuing as counsel in the case based on
counsel’s “recalcitrance” in addressing the inadvertent disclosure and “the unfair tactical
advantage gained from such disclosure”).
160. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B).
161. See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff Relion’s Motion to Enforce Stipu-
lated Protective Order Against Defendant ASRC at 1–2, Relion, Inc. v. Hydra Fuel Cell
Corp., No. 06-cv-00607 HU, 2008 WL 5585057 (D. Or. Sept. 12, 2008) (stating that ASRC
filed a motion that directly quoted from and attached privileged e-mails that Relion had
inadvertently produced).
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For matters pending in state court, if the state has no rule compa-
rable to FRCP 26(b)(5)(B),162 the only legal authority that addresses
use pending the waiver ruling is a professional conduct rule, ethics
opinion, or case law.  In a state that has adopted Model Rule 4.4(b),
receiving counsel is required to notify sending counsel of the disclo-
sure but is not required under the rule to take any action to protect
the opponent’s information pending the waiver ruling.163
B. Little or No Protection for Confidences Disclosed Outside of
Litigation
Recent changes in federal procedure and evidence rules do not
appear to be applicable to transactional attorneys dealing with inad-
vertent disclosure.164  Thus, when an inadvertent disclosure occurs
outside of litigation, the receiving attorney is left to determine the
applicable professional conduct rule or ethics opinion.  The first hur-
dle is choice of law, which is often a difficult issue for transactional
attorneys with multi-jurisdictional practices.165  In most jurisdictions
that have a professional conduct rule or ethics opinion addressing the
issue, the receiving attorney must determine if the disclosure was “in-
advertent,” a question that the attorney may answer in the interest of
his or her own client.166
162. Some states have adopted rules of civil procedure with protections identical or simi-
lar to those provided by FRCP 26(b)(5)(B). See, e.g., ARK. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B) (“Within
fourteen calendar days of receiving notice of an inadvertent disclosure, a receiving party
must return, sequester, or destroy the specified materials and all copies.  After receiving
this notice, the receiving party may not use or disclose the materials in any way.”); MICH. R.
CIV. P. 2.302(B)(7) (using language similar to the federal rule, listed under the heading
“Information Inadvertently Produced”); TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.3(d) (allowing a sending attor-
ney to identify privileged or work product protected information within ten days of discov-
ering its production and requiring the receiving attorney to “promptly return the specified
material or information and any copies pending any ruling by the court denying the
privilege”).
163. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) cmt. 2 (2009).
164. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B) (applying only when documents are produced in
discovery); FED. R. EVID. 502 (applying to privilege waiver in federal courts).  Transactional
attorneys can enter Privilege Disclosure Agreements, of course, but without a pending
case, they cannot seek a court order implementing the agreement. See FED. R. EVID.
502(d).
165. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5(a) (2009) (stipulating that an attorney
may be subject to discipline in more than one jurisdiction); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CON-
DUCT R. 8.5(b)(2) (2009) (explaining that outside of litigation, the applicable rule is that
of the jurisdiction where the lawyer’s conduct occurred or in the jurisdiction where the
predominant effect of the conduct occurred); see also Mark J. Fucile, Important Choices:
Choice of Law under Model Rule 8.5(b), 19 No. 2 PROF. LAW. 20, 20 (2009) (explaining that
Model Rule 8.5(b) “addresses litigation and non-litigation matters separately”).
166. See supra text accompanying note 58 (noting that thirty-nine of forty-one jurisdic- R
tions with a professional conduct rule require receiving counsel to determine “inadver-
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Even if a transactional attorney determines an opponent’s disclo-
sure was inadvertent, the ethics rules and opinions impose few re-
quirements on the receiving attorney.  In states that follow Model
Rule 4.4(b), the receiving attorney must only give notice to the send-
ing attorney.167  As previously discussed, comments to the rule provide
that whether additional steps are required, such as returning the doc-
ument, turns on legal issues beyond the scope of the rule.168  The
“legal issue” is privilege waiver, an issue that may appear to be inappli-
cable outside of litigation.169  Thus, the receiving transactional attor-
ney is left to balance the interests of his or her client in taking full
advantage of the disclosure against professional courtesy and further-
ing the profession’s interest in confidentiality.170
While the receiving attorney sorts through these issues, the send-
ing attorney, if he or she realizes the error, struggles with how to miti-
gate the damage.  The transactional attorney is not concerned about
admissibility at trial, but knows that losing control of the information
may have repercussions in the present transaction as well as in future
litigation against the client.  Unlike the receiving lawyer, the sending
attorney likely thinks the law of privilege waiver is applicable, particu-
larly when there is precedent that would support an order that the
document must be returned and other relief be granted.171  But if
receiving counsel does not agree to return the document, the sending
attorney has a significant problem—lack of a forum.  Many who favor
Model Rule 4.4(b) assume that even though the rule does not require
the document’s return, the sending attorney can seek a court’s assis-
tence”); see also supra notes 13–18, 126, 136 and accompanying text (discussing examples of R
how attorneys answer the “inadvertence” question in a way that allows them to avoid obliga-
tions to protect an opponent’s information).
167. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2009).
168. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) cmt. 2 (2009).
169. Perlman, supra note 33, at 777–78 (asserting that “[w]aiver law does not offer any R
guidance” to a transactional attorney who receives an inadvertent disclosure).
170. Comment 3 to Model Rule 4.4 provides the following:
Some lawyers may choose to return a document unread, for example, when the
lawyer learns before receiving the document that it was inadvertently sent to the
wrong address.  Where a lawyer is not required by applicable law to do so, the
decision to voluntarily return such a document is a matter of professional judg-
ment ordinarily reserved to the lawyer.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 3 (2009).  Elsewhere, comments provide that
attorneys are not required to “press for every advantage” for the client and that the lawyer
is not required to use “offensive tactics.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1
(2009).  Another comment states that normally the client defers to the lawyer regarding
the means of accomplishing client objectives, “particularly with respect to technical, legal
and tactical matters.”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 2 (2009).
171. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing the substantive law of privilege R
waiver and how it is used to seek return of a document and other relief).
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tance in determining the ultimate disposition of the document.172
But without pending litigation, that is not the case.173
C. Metadata
In most jurisdictions, “inadvertence” is a central issue in deter-
mining a receiving attorney’s duties upon discovery of an opponent’s
confidential metadata.  Some state ethics opinions specifically require
attorneys to determine if confidential metadata was produced inadver-
tently;174  Maine states this obligation in comments to its professional
conduct rule 4.4(b).175  In the absence of an ethics opinion on
metadata, thirty-nine jurisdictions’ professional conduct rules require
a receiving attorney to determine if an opponent produced confiden-
tial information “inadvertently.”176  Even when the confidential infor-
mation is contained in metadata, these rules apply.177
If inadvertence turns on the amount of care taken by the sending
attorney,178 determining inadvertence is no easy task given the various
172. See, e.g., Barrer, supra note 30, at 37 (“The sender of inadvertently disclosed infor- R
mation should take all steps necessary to rectify the problem including an application to
the appropriate court or tribunal.”); Zachary Wang, Ethics and Electronic Discovery: New Me-
dium, Same Problems, 75 DEF. COUNS. J. 328, 342 (2008) (noting that a receiving lawyer is not
legally or ethically required to return an inadvertently disclosed document and concluding
that leaving the decision to the judge “makes sense” because it allows the sending attorney
an opportunity to seek the document’s return and allows the receiving attorney to act
zealously in the interest of her own client); Dike, supra note 30, at 294–95 (explaining that R
“the best course of action for a receiving attorney is to notify opposing counsel of the
mistaken communication and then seek assistance from the court in determining the proper
disposition of the inadvertently disclosed materials”; thus, “[states] whose rules of profes-
sional conduct are silent on this issue . . . should choose the ‘notify only’ approach as the
proper response to inadvertent disclosure” (emphasis added)); American Bar Association
Center for Professional Responsibility, supra note 46 (“The Commission decided that this R
Rule should require only that the lawyer notify the sender . . . thus permitting the sending
lawyer to take whatever steps might be necessary or available to protect the interests of the
sending lawyer’s client.”).
173. Arguably the transactional attorney could file a separate action seeking the docu-
ment’s return, such as a declaratory judgment action.  Nonetheless, this author’s research
reveals no reported case in which a disclosing party sought return of a document disclosed
outside of litigation. But cf. Perlman, supra note 33, 778 n.48 (“In the non-litigation con- R
text, parties seek court orders when a conflict of interest has arisen, so perhaps a party
could seek a court order requiring the recipient to return the document.”).
174. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. R
175. See ME. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 4 (2009); see also supra text accompa-
nying note 84. R
176. See supra text accompanying note 58. R
177. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 2 (2009) (noting that the rule
applies to any electronically transmitted material “subject to being read or put into reada-
ble form”).
178. See supra text accompanying notes 9–11 (discussing various definitions of R
inadvertence).
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ways metadata disclosure might occur.  On one end of the spectrum, a
sending attorney may be aware that confidential information could be
contained in metadata of a document, such as a draft contract e-
mailed to opposing counsel, but he or she nonetheless disregards the
obligation to remove the metadata, hoping that the receiving attorney
will not find it.  On the other end of the spectrum, an attorney may
mistakenly believe the format of a document sent does not contain
metadata179 or may try but fail to remove confidential information in
the metadata of a document.180  Even if receiving counsel determines
that the metadata was provided “inadvertently,” states that follow
Model Rule 4.4(b) require only notice to the sending attorney.181
Meanwhile, the receiving attorney is legally and ethically permitted to
disseminate the information unless prohibited by a Privilege Disclo-
sure Agreement, Privilege Disclosure Order, or some other source of
law.182  Unless the metadata disclosure occurred in discovery in a fed-
eral court, FRCP 26(b)(5)(B) will not protect the content of the infor-
mation pending a waiver ruling.183
The situation is different, but not necessarily better, in the juris-
dictions that prohibit attorneys from viewing an opponent’s
metadata.184  These jurisdictions assume the receiving attorney has a
sinister motive in searching metadata and overlook the legitimate rea-
sons for doing so.185  The jurisdictions acknowledge (or at least do not
prohibit) searching metadata produced in discovery.186  But even
179. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (explaining that the PDF file format that R
attorneys have been encouraged to use often contains metadata).
180. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (explaining user errors in attempts to R
remove or not create metadata).
181. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2009).
182. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2009) (containing no prohibition on
a receiving attorney disseminating inadvertently sent information either in the rule itself or
in any of its accompanying footnotes).
183. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B).
184. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. R
185. See, e.g., Hricik, supra note 25, at 100 (“A lawyer who deliberately takes steps to view R
embedded data is engaging in a deliberate review of information that she ostensibly knows
should have been removed, and which she knows is confidential, at a minimum.”); Peter
Mierzwa, Metadata: Now You Don’t See It—Now You Do, CHI. B. ASS’N REC., Oct. 2006, at 52,
56 (quoting a member of the Florida Bar Board of Governors as stating, “I have no doubt
that anyone who receives a document and mines it . . . is unethical, unprofessional, and
uneverything else”); Bradley H. Leiber, Note, Applying Ethics Rules to Rapidly Changing Tech-
nology: The D.C. Bar’s Approach to Metadata, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 893, 909 (2008) (noting
that some jurisdictions view the use of metadata as “bad”).
186. Indeed, this use of metadata is one of the reasons recent amendments to the fed-
eral civil procedure rules encourage production of electronically stored information in its
native format. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E) (requiring that electronically stored informa-
tion be produced as “kept in the usual course of business” or “in a reasonably usable
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outside of discovery, an attorney may have a reason other than uncov-
ering an opposing party’s confidences to review metadata.  For exam-
ple, counsel may be trying to remember if she, or her opponent, was
the attorney who last revised language in a particular provision of a
draft contract or proposed settlement agreement.187  The simple act
of turning on “track changes” in a word processing program may re-
veal this information, but it may also reveal an opponent’s confiden-
tial information.  The absolute ban on metadata review prohibits
legitimate uses of technology and may give sending attorneys a false
sense that they do not have to protect against the disclosure of confi-
dential metadata.188
V. INTERESTS FURTHERED BY A PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT SOLUTION TO
INADVERTENT DISCLOSURE
Since adopting Model Rule 4.4(b) and withdrawing ABA Formal
Opinion 92-368, the ABA has been steadfast in its assertion that inad-
vertent disclosure raises a legal, rather than a professional conduct,
issue.189  Cognizant of the continuing problems associated with inad-
vertent disclosure—and apparently believing the ABA could not con-
tribute to the solution through professional conduct rules—the ABA
form”); Ralph C. Losey, Hash: The New Bates Stamp, 12 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 21 n.78, 21–22
(2007) (noting that the “usual course of business is to keep [electronically stored informa-
tion] in its native format” and arguing that native files are “likely to become the preferred
format” for the production of electronically stored information under the amended rules).
187. See Colo. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 119 (2008) (asserting that in some
circumstances, metadata, such as redlines or comments in a draft contract or formulas in a
spreadsheet, is intended to be “searched for, reviewed, and used” by receiving counsel).
188. Even in a jurisdiction with a ban on receiving counsel’s review, the sending attor-
ney must be diligent to avoid disclosure of confidential metadata.  Sending attorneys are
required to do so under state versions of Model Rule 1.6(a), which states that a lawyer shall
not reveal confidential information unless the client gives informed consent or certain
exceptions are met. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2009). As a practical
matter, even if the receiving attorney’s conduct is governed by an ethics opinion in one of
the prohibition-on-review jurisdictions, there is still a risk that he or she does not know of
the opinion and will review the information or that a non-lawyer, such as a client or third
party, will review the information. See Israel, supra note 77, at 470, 482 (explaining that R
media sources, rather than opposing counsel, intentionally reviewed metadata in court
filings to find confidential information revealing that attorneys and their client had origi-
nally planned to sue a different defendant).
189. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 2 (2009) (“Whether the lawyer is
required to take additional steps [beyond notification], such as returning the original doc-
ument, is a matter of law beyond the scope of these Rules, as is the question of whether the
privileged status of a document has been waived.” (emphasis added)); Margaret Colgate
Love, The Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Summary of the Work of Ethics 2000,
15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 441, 469 (2002) (explaining that the commission that drafted
Model Rule 4.4(b) “decided against trying to sort out a lawyer’s possible legal obligations in
connection with examining and using” inadvertently disclosed documents (emphasis added)).
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lobbied for federal evidence and procedure rules to address the
issue.190
The resulting federal rules are undoubtedly a necessary step to-
ward addressing inadvertent disclosure in the age of electronically
stored information.  Despite the problems with Privilege Disclosure
Agreements and Orders, the new rules address the realities of modern
practice: The ease of electronic communication and the volume of
information make it neither possible nor practical to prevent every
disclosure.191  Other protections are therefore necessary.  Further, the
federal rules recognize that litigation is not an isolated event192 and
that attorneys should have the ability to protect their clients from an
inadvertently disclosed document being used in future litigation.193
And even though there is reason to doubt that FRE 502 has succeeded
on this front, the rule recognizes that attorneys need more certainty
about when a privilege disclosure will result in waiver.194
190. See Section of Litigation, American Bar Association, Report to the House of Dele-
gates 120D (2006) (recommending amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence and/or
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to address inadvertent disclosure and privilege
waiver).  Multiple letters from the ABA advocated the passage of FRE 502. See, e.g., Letter
from Kim J. Askew, Chair, ABA Section of Litig., to The Honorable Peter G. McCabe, Sec’y
of the Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure (Feb. 15, 2007), available at http://
www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/materials/079/079.pdf (suggesting revision to Ad-
visory Committee’s proposed 502(b)); Letter from Denise A. Cardman, Acting Dir., ABA
Governmental Affairs Office, to The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., Chairman, Comm. on
the Judiciary, The Honorable Lamar S. Smith, Ranking Member, Comm. on the Judiciary,
The Honorable Howard L. Berman, Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet & Intel-
lectual Prop., Comm. on the Judiciary, The Honorable Howard Coble, Ranking Member,
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet & Intellectual Prop., Comm. on the Judiciary (Mar. 21,
2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/attyclient/2008mar21_fre502
govtaffh_l.pdf (supporting the adoption of FRE 502); Letter from Denise A. Cardman,
Acting Dir., ABA Governmental Affairs Office, to Honorable Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman,
Comm. on the Judiciary, Honorable Arlen Specter, Ranking Member, Comm. on the Judi-
ciary (Dec. 7, 2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/attyclient/2007dec
07_fre502s_l.pdf (supporting the adoption of FRE 502); Letter from R. William Ide, III,
Chair, ABA Task Force on Attorney-Client Privilege, to The Honorable Peter G. McCabe,
Sec’y of the Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure (Feb. 15, 2007), available at http://
www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/attyclient/2007feb15_rule502tf_l.pdf (proposing an im-
plied waiver amendment); Letter from Judith A. Miller, Chair, ABA Section of Litig., to
The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, The Honorable
Lamar S. Smith, Ranking Member, Comm. on the Judiciary (Mar. 21, 2008), available at
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/attyclient/2008mar21_fre502litsech_l.pdf (sup-
porting the adoption of FRE 502).
191. See supra text accompanying notes 19–34 (discussing the risks and likelihood of R
privilege disclosure).
192. See supra notes 111, 126, 141, 143 and accompanying text (discussing risk of waiver R
in subsequent litigation and noting cases where a party was involved in multiple cases in
which privilege waiver was at issue).
193. See FED. R. EVID. 502(d).
194. See supra notes 100, 114 and accompanying text. R
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Despite these advances, the federal rules have not—and indeed
cannot—adequately protect the profession’s interests in the inadver-
tent disclosure arena.  State bars and the ABA should recognize that
their stake in this matter extends beyond federal courts, beyond dis-
closures in the context of discovery, and beyond litigation.  These ar-
eas can be addressed by professional conduct rules.195  The following
Sections consider the bar’s interests in confidentiality, compliance, ef-
ficiency, and setting the standards for professional behavior, and ex-
plain why each of these interests can be advanced by revising
professional conduct rules that touch upon inadvertent disclosure.
A. Protecting Confidentiality
Confidentiality is essential to the uncensored communications
that are necessary for the attorney-client relationship.196  Protecting
confidential and privileged information was a central consideration by
the ABA when it issued Formal Opinion 92-368.197  The ABA ex-
plained that it could not identify a more important principle to pro-
tect than the “strong policy in favor of confidentiality.”198  The
committee concluded that it could not countenance or encourage at-
torney conduct in response to inadvertent disclosure that would be in
derogation of confidentiality.199  Even after withdrawing that opin-
195. Because a federal court can adopt its own attorney conduct rules, it can adopt the
rules of the state in which it sits. See, e.g., E.D. TENN. R. 83.6 (adopting the Supreme Court
of Tennessee’s professional conduct rules); see also Eli J. Richardson, Demystifying the Federal
Law of Attorney Ethics, 29 GA. L. REV. 137, 150–52 (1994).  Thus, a federal court interested
in adopting attorney conduct rules such as those proposed in this Article could do so, even
if state bars and the ABA decline to do so.
196. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2009).  The comment provides
the following:
[Confidentiality] contributes to the trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer
relationship.  The client is thereby encouraged to seek legal assistance and to
communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally
damaging subject matter.  The lawyer needs this information to represent the
client effectively and, if necessary, to advise the client to refrain from wrongful
conduct. . . . Based on experience, lawyers know that almost all clients follow the
advice given, and the law is upheld.
Id.
197. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-368 (1992),
withdrawn by Formal Op. 05-437 (2005).  Discussing the bar’s interest in confidentiality, the
Standing Committee noted the importance of “full, free and frank exchange[s] between
lawyer and client.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The committee observed that
absent a guarantee of confidentiality, critical discussion will be proscribed or intruded
upon in a way that will impact the ability of lawyers to serve clients, and that there will be a
chilling effect on the attorney-client relationship if counsel fears that confidential informa-
tion will be shared with those with adverse interests to the client. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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ion,200 the ABA has devoted substantial resources to advocating pro-
tection for the attorney-client privilege against various threats,201
including the threat posed by inadvertent disclosure.202  The ABA her-
alded FRE 502 as essential to protecting the attorney-client privilege
and work product protection.203
A missing element in the legal solution provided by the federal
rules is comprehensive protection of the content of confidential infor-
mation—both before and after its inadvertent disclosure—until a
court determines that the privilege was waived.  The federal proce-
dure and evidence rules have the effect of encouraging attorneys to
agree to little or no pre-production review and to seek court orders
implementing these agreements.204  As demonstrated by the cases dis-
cussed in Part IV, the result can be production of privileged informa-
tion to an opponent who uses the information to his or her client’s
advantage and then argues that the privilege was waived by the disclo-
200. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 05-437 (2005).
201. For example, the ABA Task Force on Attorney-Client Privilege has lobbied against
government policies that encourage businesses to waive the attorney-client privilege. See
American Bar Association Task Force on Attorney-Client Privilege, http://
www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/home.shtml (last visited Feb. 13, 2010).  Others as-
sert that the ABA has taken a somewhat schizophrenic approach to privilege and confiden-
tiality—arguing for the protection of privilege in some contexts, but taking steps to erode
confidentiality in others, such as by amending in 2003 Model Rule 1.13 regarding organiza-
tional clients. See Thomas G. Bost, Corporate Lawyers After the Big Quake: The Conceptual Fault
Line in the Professional Duty of Confidentiality, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1089, 1092 (2006)
(explaining that in 2003, the ABA “diminish[ed] the . . . interests of corporate clients in
maintaining confidentiality”); Lawrence J. Fox, Can Client Confidentiality Survive Enron, Ar-
thur Andersen, and the ABA?, 34 STETSON L. REV. 147, 157 (2004) (noting that Model Rule
1.13 gave an attorney “permission to disclose confidential information beyond the [corpo-
rate] client”).  The amendment to Model Rule 1.13 does not demonstrate an abandon-
ment of confidentiality, but rather a recognition that in narrow circumstances there may
be countervailing interests, including the client’s own interest. See Paula Schaefer, Protect-
ing a Business Entity Client from Itself Through Loyal Disclosure, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 152,
153 (2009).  In the context of inadvertent disclosure, the bar has not identified any interest
that is more important than protecting confidentiality pending a waiver determination,
and should provide such protection in professional conduct rules.
202. See supra note 190 (noting ABA efforts to influence the content of federal rules R
addressing inadvertent disclosure).
203. See H. Thomas Wells Jr., President, Am. Bar Ass’n, Statement Regarding Congres-
sional Approval of Federal Rule of Evidence 502 (Sept. 9, 2008), available at http://
www.abanet.org/abanet/media/statement/statement.cfm?releaseid=443 (“By clarifying
the law . . . [FRE 502] will help preserve fundamental attorney-client privilege and work
product protections of all parties, while substantially reducing unnecessary discovery costs
that would be passed on to consumers.”).
204. See supra text accompanying notes 101–04, 110–11; see also Noyes, supra note 104, at R
760 (asserting that it may become the norm for federal courts to enter orders under FRE
502(d) and for attorneys to voluntarily produce privileged documents without reviewing
them, which “may ultimately dilute and weaken the importance of . . . state laws that pro-
tect the relationship between attorney and client”).
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sure.205  While FRCP 26(b)(5)(B) provides some protection against
use of the content of a privileged document prior to a waiver ruling,
that protection is incomplete.206
Inadvertent disclosure is so common today that most practition-
ers will soon have firsthand knowledge of the current state of the law
and the lack of protection for the content of their communications.  If
attorneys and clients doubt that the content of privileged information
will be protected, they may change the way they discuss matters with
one another.207  While many would argue that too many confidential
thoughts are put in writing today (particularly in e-mail), something is
lost when attorneys and clients purposely avoid the written word.
There may be a misunderstanding about the advice being sought and
the advice being given.  The deliberative process that occurs when an
attorney puts thoughts in writing to a client will be compromised.  Cli-
ents will have less opportunity to digest and reflect upon counsel’s
advice.  To the detriment of their clients, attorneys may forget key
information that they feared putting in writing.  And to their own det-
riment, attorneys with no written records may have less ability to de-
fend themselves if a client asserts attorney misconduct or malpractice.
The bar must consider how professional conduct rules could bol-
ster confidence in confidentiality.  Waiver is a legal issue, but protect-
ing the profession’s faith in confidentiality is a professional conduct
issue.  Solutions to both problems are compatible and can be achieved
through rules that require attorneys to protect the content of confi-
dential information both before and after disclosure.
1. Pre-Disclosure Protection of Confidentiality
If disclosure is truly “inadvertent,” it may seem that a professional
conduct rule cannot avert the disclosure.  This Article, however, has
identified two areas in which professional conduct rules could educate
attorneys and thus prevent unnecessary compromise of confidential
205. See supra text accompanying notes 129–38. R
206. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B); see also supra text accompanying notes 151–63. R
207. In 1981, the Supreme Court asserted the following:
[I]f the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be served, the attorney and
client must be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular
discussions will be protected.  An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be
certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than
no privilege at all.
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981). But see Dennis J. Tuchler, Teaching
Legal Profession: Ethics Under the Model Rules, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1161, 1171 n.35 (2007) (“It
is unlikely that the possibility of inadvertent disclosure seriously reduces the value to the
client of the duty of confidentiality.”).
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information.  One area is metadata.  Comments to the Confidentiality
of Information rule—Model Rule 1.6—could advise attorneys of spe-
cific methods that can be used to protect confidential information in
metadata.208
The second area is Privilege Disclosure Agreements and Or-
ders.209  As described throughout this Article, Privilege Disclosure
Agreements and Orders anticipate that counsel may disclose the cli-
ent’s confidential information, but that those confidences will be pro-
tected against adverse use and waiver.210  Because the current
Confidentiality of Information rule requires counsel to protect client
confidences unless informed consent is given by the client to do oth-
erwise,211 an attorney should not enter a Privilege Disclosure Agree-
ment or seek a related Order without that consent.212
208. See supra text accompanying notes 68–79 (discussing sparse guidance in current R
authorities regarding how attorneys should protect against disclosure of confidential
metadata).
209. Some have asserted that it should not be necessary to use a Privilege Disclosure
Agreement to avoid privilege waiver following inadvertent disclosure. See Paul & Baron,
supra note 19, at 38 (“[O]ne can question whether immunity from privilege waiver, R
through an inadvertent disclosure of information, should be dependent on an agreement
at all, since in many instances there will be no agreement, yet the same cost-saving policies
regarding lack of punitive privilege waiver rules should apply.”).  Greater protection
against waiver could be provided in the evidence rules, which could prohibit waiver as a
consequence of any disclosure of confidential information.  But then parties would have
no incentive to protect client confidences.  Privilege Disclosure Agreements and Orders
provide a better solution.  Through these devices, parties can make a rational, thoughtful
decision about the specific efforts they will make to avoid disclosure of client confidences,
protections to be provided if disclosure occurs, and the standard to be applied if the recipi-
ent argues disclosure waived privilege. See infra Part VI.B (discussing issues that should be
discussed with a client in entering Privilege Disclosure Agreements).
210. See supra text accompanying notes 101–04, 110–11 (defining Privilege Disclosure R
Agreements and Orders).
211. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2009) (“A lawyer shall not reveal in-
formation relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed con-
sent . . . .”).  Attorneys should not assume that Privilege Disclosure Agreements or Orders
are simply a “means” of achieving the client’s goals that do not require client consent. See
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a) (2009).  Because Privilege Disclosure Agree-
ments and Orders impact confidentiality, counsel is required to follow the provisions of
Model Rules 1.6(a) and 1.4(a) that require informed consent. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.6(a), 1.4(a) (2009).
212. A different issue is presented when the court enters a Privilege Disclosure Order
that is opposed by counsel and client.  Professor Noyes asks, “Does [a Privilege Disclosure
Order entered despite client objection] require the attorney to violate [professional con-
duct obligations]?”  Noyes, supra note 104, at 746.  While the attorney should object to an R
order that is unacceptable to the client, it would not be professional misconduct for the
attorney to abide by the order if it was entered despite objection. See MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(6) (2009) (permitting disclosure of confidential information if
the lawyer reasonably believes it necessary “to comply with . . . a court order”); MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(6) cmts. 13, 15 (2009) (requiring counsel to consult
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While some may read the Confidentiality of Information rule to
require consent only when counsel plans to disclose the client’s confi-
dential information intentionally, such as under a quick peek-style
agreement,213 that reading is too narrow.  Model Rule 1.6 requires a
client’s own attorney to preserve client confidences, and if counsel
thinks it is appropriate to shift that obligation to opposing counsel or
to the courts through a Privilege Disclosure Agreement or Order, that
document impacts confidentiality and the client’s consent should be
obtained.214  It is of note that these agreements often include privi-
lege review protocols that contemplate less than a document-by-docu-
ment pre-production privilege review, but more than the intentional
disclosure of confidences as under a quick peek agreement.215  These
protocols can result in a heightened risk of disclosure, which may or
may not be acceptable to the client in light of the client’s facts, the
protections and risks inherent in the proposed Privilege Disclosure
with the client regarding the possibility of an appeal, but explaining that absent appeal,
subsection (b)(6) permits compliance with the court order).
213. See, e.g., THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 123, at 54 (noting that “[i]t is possi- R
ble” that entering a quick peek agreement could result in a violation of an attorney’s ethi-
cal duty to protect client confidences).
214. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2009).  Informed consent to the terms
of a Privilege Disclosure Order, developed by a competent, diligent attorney, is distinct
from an agreement that purports to insulate counsel from professional negligence for
“sloppy” efforts to protect client confidences.  The latter is prohibited by Model Rule
1.8(h). See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h) (2009) (prohibiting a lawyer from
making an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer’s liability to a client for malpractice,
unless the client is independently represented).
215. See, e.g., Spieker v. Quest Cherokee, LLC, No. 07-1225-EFM, 2008 WL 4758604, at
*4 (D. Kan. Oct. 30, 2008) (encouraging counsel to utilize FRE 502 so that they can agree
to a less exhaustive pre-production privilege review); Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v.
Michelson, 229 F.R.D. 550, 559–62 (W.D. Tenn. 2003) (ordering party to use a privilege
review protocol that involved keyword searches and subsequent attorney review and provid-
ing that the producing party does not waive privilege for any privileged documents pro-
duced in the case).  Examples abound of methods and protocols used to detect privileged
information. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee’s note (asserting that in
light of the number of documents to be reviewed and time constraints of a case, it may be
reasonable for litigants to use “advanced analytical software applications and linguistic
tools in screening for privilege and work product”); The Honorable Shira A. Scheindlin &
Jonathan M. Redgrave, Special Masters and E-Discovery: The Intersection of Two Recent Revisions
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 347, 374–76 (2008) (highlighting
trends in the appointment of special masters to facilitate the electronic discovery process);
Sasha K. Danna, Comment, The Impact of Electronic Discovery on Privilege and the Applicability of
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1683, 1718–19 (2005) (empha-
sizing the usefulness of keyword searches in identifying and reducing the number of privi-
leged documents that must be reviewed); Jonathan M. Redgrave & Kristin M. Nimsger,
Electronic Discovery and Inadvertent Productions of Privileged Documents, FED. LAW., July 2002, at
37, 39 (discussing the use of computer searches, software that analyzes word matches to
locate privileged information, human review, and coordination between attorneys and dis-
covery consultants).
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Agreement or Order and applicable law, and available alternatives.  A
client can only provide “informed” consent if attorneys explain the
factual and legal issues relevant to the decision; comments to the Con-
fidentiality of Information rule could guide counsel through these
topics.216
2. Post-Disclosure Protection of Confidentiality
Before the bar can embrace a professional conduct rule that pro-
tects confidential information after disclosure, the profession must
move beyond the narrow lens underlying Model Rule 4.4(b): You can-
not “unring the bell” of inadvertent disclosure.217  Undoubtedly, when
a confidential document is read by an opponent, some harm is
done.218  But that harm need not be compounded by the bar’s acqui-
escence to receiving attorneys refusing to return the document, mak-
ing notes as they dissect and analyze its contents, and forwarding it to
others, perhaps even third parties who may use the document in sub-
sequent litigation or non-litigation matters, before any court determines
that privilege was waived.
Ironically, ABA Formal Opinion 92-368 recognized the truth that
the harm need not be compounded in an age when the fax machine
216. Alternatively, if state bars and the ABA do not believe that the current Confidential-
ity of Information rule requires client consent to Privilege Disclosure Agreements and Or-
ders, the rule could be revised to explicitly require informed consent to clawback, quick
peek, and other agreements concerning confidential client information.  Such a revision
could work in harmony with the proposed comments to Model Rule 1.6 outlined in this
Article. See infra app. A.
217. This is the approach implicit in the Model Rules’ advice that whether the docu-
ment should be returned is a matter of law beyond the scope of the rules. See MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 2 (2009); see also Ill. State Bar Ass’n, Op. 98-04
(1999) (“ABA Formal Opinion 92-368 is unrealistic, expecting the receiving lawyer to ‘unr-
ing the bell’ and ignore material information that has been received and reviewed in good
faith.”); Barrer, supra note 30, at 39 (“[Y]ou cannot ‘un-ring’ a bell. . . .  Once it has been R
reviewed, it is difficult if not impossible to ‘unlearn’ the information disclosed.”); Perlman,
supra note 33, at 806 (“Because returning the document would not erase what the receiv- R
ing lawyer already learned, a rule requiring the document’s return would accomplish very
little.”); Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal & Hon. James C. Francis IV, Managing Electronic Discovery:
Views from the Judges, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 31 (2007) (noting the problem that you cannot
“un-ring the bell”).
218. See Michael D. Fielding, You Need to Know This: Bankruptcy and Attorney-Client Privilege
in the Electronic Age, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec.–Jan. 2007, at 61, 64 (asserting that even if a
court orders the return or destruction of privileged material, disclosed documents may
nonetheless have an impact on settlement negotiations); Perlman, supra note 33, at 806 R
(explaining that a rule that mandates the return of a document has little utility since the
receiving attorney cannot eliminate from their mind what they learned from the document
simply by virtue of returning it).
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was the greatest inadvertent disclosure culprit.219  Today, the risks of
inadvertent disclosure have expanded exponentially.  Compounding
the risk, courts are urging parties to use Privilege Disclosure Orders
instead of exhaustive pre-production privilege review.220  These cir-
cumstances have resulted in opponents receiving confidential infor-
mation they were not intended, or entitled, to see.  Prohibiting
receiving attorneys from using the information before a waiver ruling
does not unfairly “punish” them.221  Further, allowing receiving attor-
neys to use the information does not discourage future inadvertent
disclosures—these disclosures are happening despite current punish-
ment under the law.222  Attorneys, clients, and the bar have an interest
in preventing further exploitation and use of an opponent’s confiden-
tial information.223  It causes no harm to litigators to delay use unless
and until they receive a waiver ruling.224  Moreover, without such a
219. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-368 (1992), with-
drawn by Formal Op. 05-437 (2005) (lamenting the possibility that a “facsimile machine will
still be ‘mis-speed-dialed’” and later concluding that “even where the receiving lawyer ex-
amines the materials before discovering that they were mis-sent, there is still value in main-
taining what confidentiality remains” (emphasis added)).
220. See, e.g., Spieker, 2008 WL 4758604, at *4 (urging counsel to discuss FRE 502 in
future production and cost discussions because the rule was enacted “to reduce the costs of
exhaustive privilege reviews of [electronically stored information]”).
221. See, e.g., Ill. State Bar Ass’n, Op. 98-04 (1999) (arguing that ABA Formal Opinion
92-368 put the burden on the “wrong party,” asking the receiving lawyer to protect the
“careless” lawyer); DiLernia, supra note 145, at 540 (arguing that putting the burden on R
receiving counsel to alert sending counsel of an inadvertent disclosure may increase the
number of “false alarms” and “condones and perhaps even encourages insouciance or mal-
ice from the producer, who would then have a way to drain the opposing party’s resources
with little, if any, additional cost or effort”); Hundley, supra note 87, at 283 (“When the R
adversary learns privileged information, not through any wrongdoing on her part, but
through the negligence of the party responsible for guarding the confidence, curative
measures not only are of dubious efficacy; they seem downright unjust and counter-pro-
ductive.”); Kurt L. Schmalz, On the Receiving End, L.A. LAW., June 2006, at 33, 38 (“[T]he
courts should not be in the business of compelling attorneys to clean up their opposing
counsel’s mistakes. . . .  [C]ourts should be careful not to advance amorphous interpreta-
tions of fair play at the expense of the lawyer’s fundamental duty to zealously represent his
or her client.”).
222. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-368
(1992), withdrawn by Formal Op. 05-437 (2005) (discussing the argument that “letting the
receiving lawyer keep the confidential materials in this situation [of inadvertent disclosure]
will encourage more careful conduct on the part of other counsel in the future”).
223. See State Comp. Ins. Fund v. WPS, Inc., 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 799, 808 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999) (“We believe a client should not enter the attorney-client relationship fearful that an
inadvertent error by its counsel could result in the waiver of privileged information or the
retention of the privileged information by an adversary who might abuse and disseminate the informa-
tion with impunity.” (emphasis added)).
224. This point responds to the ABA’s assertion that whether the document should be
returned is a matter of law beyond the scope of professional conduct rules. See MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 2 (2009).  Professional conduct rules that require
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rule, transactional attorneys will continue to have no remedy.  In both
cases, requiring attorneys to protect an opponent’s confidences can
help slow the erosion of the profession’s faith in confidentiality.
B. Promoting Compliance with Professional Conduct Expectations
Incorporating specific guidance into the professional conduct
rules and comments would lead to greater compliance with the bar’s
expectations for senders and recipients of inadvertent disclosures.
Currently, these expectations are difficult to discern in many states.
In ten jurisdictions, there is still no professional conduct rule that ad-
dresses the issue of inadvertent disclosure; any authority that exists is
scattered throughout ethics opinions and case law.225  In some juris-
dictions, the authorities appear to be in conflict.226  Guidance in deal-
ing with confidential information in metadata is even slimmer: Only
one state references metadata in its professional conduct rule.227  Fur-
ther, just a small number of states’ ethics opinions address metadata—
and the authorities are split regarding what an ethical attorney should
do.228
When it is difficult for attorneys to find professional conduct gui-
dance, it is likely they will not fulfill the bar’s expectations.  For exam-
the document to be returned, and otherwise protected, prior to the waiver determination
do not interfere with the legal issue and are preferable to current ethics rules in light of
the fact that the court may ultimately find that privilege was not waived.
225. See supra notes 46–51, 56–61 and accompanying text (discussing various profes- R
sional conduct rules, opinions, and case law addressing receiving counsel’s obligations).
226. For example, in California, no professional conduct rule addresses the issue, but
opinions of California appellate courts have provided seemingly inconsistent messages to
receiving counsel. See Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Transp. Indem. Ins., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862,
867–68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (explaining that an attorney has a professional obligation to
his client to utilize information learned through an opponent’s inadvertent disclosure).
But see Rico v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 171 P.3d 1092, 1098–99 (Cal. 2007) (distinguishing
Aerojet and holding that receiving counsel has an obligation to read a confidential docu-
ment no further than necessary to determine its status, to notify sending counsel, and work
with counsel or seek court intervention to resolve the issue).  Florida has now adopted
Model Rule 4.4(b), which only requires receiving counsel to provide notice of an inadver-
tent disclosure. FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4–4.4(b) (2009).  It is not clear, how-
ever, whether the rule was meant to overrule a Florida appellate court decision that
counsel can be disqualified for taking “unfair tactical advantage” by using an opponent’s
inadvertently disclosed document. See Abamar Hous. & Dev., Inc. v. Lisa Daly Lady Decor,
Inc., 724 So. 2d 572, 573–74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the “unfair tactical
advantage” gained by an inadvertent disclosure was grounds for attorney disqualification).
227. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (observing Maine’s reference to metadata R
in the comments to its professional conduct rule).
228. See supra notes 71–74, 85–86 and accompanying text; see also Mierzwa, supra note R
185, at 55 (“Though one might argue that reviewing metadata is permitted in Illinois, R
attorneys should exercise caution.  Other states have found reviewing metadata is an ethi-
cal violation and their rules are not substantially different from the Illinois Rules.”).
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ple, in Holland v. Gordy Co.,229 discussed at the beginning of this
Article,230 Michigan’s professional conduct rules were silent on the
issue of inadvertent disclosure.231  There was precedent in the jurisdic-
tion, however, that relied upon ABA Formal Opinion 92-368 to define
a receiving attorney’s duties.232  Relying on that precedent, the Hol-
land court concluded that “plaintiffs’ counsel should have refrained
from examining the materials, notified defendants’ counsel . . . and
abided defendants’ instructions until the issue was raised and ad-
dressed by the trial court.”233  Professional conduct rules should say
what they mean and mean what they say,234 particularly in addressing
an increasingly common dilemma.  The bar’s expectation should not
be a moving target.235  Articulating specific requirements in the text
of professional conduct rules would aid attorneys immeasurably as
they attempt to determine their obligations.
Another compliance issue stems from use of the word “inadver-
tent” in professional conduct rules.236  This Article contains multiple
examples of attorneys who reasoned or rationalized that an oppo-
nent’s disclosure was not “inadvertent,” so that the receiving attorney
could avoid any obligation under the professional conduct rule or
under a Privilege Disclosure Agreement or Order.237
Because the bar has an interest in attorneys complying with pro-
fessional conduct rules, it would be prudent to remove the factually
and legally complex question of inadvertence from the receiving at-
torney’s analysis.  The challenge, however, is how to create an inadver-
tent disclosure rule that does not contain the term “inadvertent.”
229. Nos. 231183–85, 2003 WL 1985800 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2003).
230. See supra text accompanying notes 13–18. R
231. See Holland, 2003 WL 1985800, at *7 (stating that Michigan draws its professional
conduct rules from the American Bar Association Model Rules).
232. Id. at *7–*8 (citing Resolution Trust Corp. v. First of Am. Bank, 868 F. Supp. 217,
220 (W.D. Mich. 1994)).
233. Id. at *8.
234. See Hellman, supra note 61, at 334 (asserting that ABA Formal Ethics Opinions R
often set forth the ABA Ethics Committee’s “view of what the rules should say or were meant
to say” rather than reflect “a straightforward exercise of [statutory] interpretation”).
235. See, e.g., Schmalz, supra note 221 (describing the ethics rules as a “moving target”). R
Another aspect of fairness to receiving counsel is the substance of the requirements.  The
number of requirements for receiving counsel in the Proposed Model Rule 4.5 may seem
onerous, but the requirements have a purpose and are fairly articulated in the rule. See
infra app. B, Proposed Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.5.  If attorneys do not follow
these provisions, it will be a choice; indeed, they will not be able to claim a lack of explana-
tion of the requirements.
236. See supra text accompanying note 58 (noting that thirty-nine of forty-one jurisdic- R
tions with a professional conduct rule addressing the issue require the receiving attorney to
determine if the opponent’s disclosure was “inadvertent”).
237. See supra notes 13–18, 126, 136 and accompanying text. R
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FRCP 26(b)(5)(B) imposes an obligation to sequester when an oppo-
nent gives notice that he or she produced a privileged or work prod-
uct protected document; the receiving attorney has no discretion to
avoid that obligation by determining the disclosure was not inadver-
tent.238  A professional conduct rule could contain similar terminol-
ogy to trigger the receiving attorney’s obligations, thus eliminating
the inadvertence question.  Such a rule, however, would take away a
positive component of the current Model Rule 4.4(b)—the receiving
attorney’s obligation to provide notice.239
Given the bar’s interest in confidentiality, a professional conduct
rule could require a receiving attorney to presume that any confiden-
tial document received from an opponent was not intentionally pro-
vided and is entitled to certain protections.  The breadth of the term
“confidential” is problematic, however.  Outside of discovery, every
document provided by opposing counsel is conceivably “confidential,”
in that all information learned in the representation of a client must
be kept in confidence unless the client consents to its disclosure or an
exception applies.240  For this reason, a rule requiring a presumption
that every confidential document was produced unintentionally is not
workable.  But a rule that requires a presumption of protection for
attorney-client privileged or work product protected information
would be effective.  This is usually the most sensitive confidential in-
formation and these categories encompass the confidential informa-
tion that can be withheld from discovery.241  A rule that incorporates
these terms is discussed in Part VII.
238. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B).  The rule does not require the sending attorney to
prove or even argue that the production was inadvertent. See id.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 154–58 (explaining that the receiving attorney is R
more likely to recognize an inadvertent disclosure, and that rules which require nothing of
the receiving attorney lead to attorney use of the privileged document without the sending
attorney’s knowledge).  It is of note that Maine, which adopted its “inadvertent disclosure”
professional conduct rule in 2009, considered the text of FRCP 26(b)(5)(B), but nonethe-
less crafted a rule that obligated receiving counsel to provide notice to sending counsel
and to take steps to protect the content of the disclosed document pending a waiver ruling
or informal resolution of the issue between the parties. See ME. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 4.4 Reporter’s Notes (2009).
240. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2009).  Within discovery, a respon-
sive, confidential document cannot be withheld unless it is also privileged or work product
protected.  Accordingly, its disclosure is either authorized or impliedly authorized under
Model Rule 1.6(a). See id.
241. See supra note 7 (discussing attorney-client privilege and work product protection). R
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C. Efficiency
As they consider the current web of authority addressing inadver-
tent disclosure, state bars and the ABA should also be concerned
about improving efficiency through rulemaking.242  Today, various
court decisions, ethics opinions, rules of procedure, and attorney con-
duct rules may or may not address a receiving attorney’s professional
conduct obligations.243  If a single, comprehensive attorney conduct
rule clearly articulated a receiving attorney’s obligations, attorneys
would not have to conduct exhaustive research each time they receive
or send confidential information.244  Further, when these various
sources of law provide little or no direction, the receiving attorney
must expend additional time deciding how to address the issue.
These questions could all be answered by a single professional con-
duct rule.  To gain such efficiency, the professional conduct rule
should be consistent with the requirements of FRCP 26(b)(5)(B), but
could also fill gaps that are unaddressed by the procedure rule.245
Further, an attorney concerned about how to fulfill his or her
confidentiality obligation with regard to metadata will have difficulty
finding guidance.246  At best, most of the ethics opinions that address
242. See Perlman, supra note 33, at 789 (explaining that promoting efficiency should be R
a concern in professional conduct rulemaking).
243. See, e.g., J. Charles Mokriski, Ethics in Advocacy: Instinct, Insight, and Competing Obliga-
tions, 14 No. 2 PROF. LAW. 2, 12 (2003) (asserting that a Massachusetts attorney who re-
ceives a misdirected confidential e-mail will research but find no clear ethical guidance
coming from a “cacophony of voices” that includes a state ethics opinion, the decision in
Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 287 (D. Mass. 2000), ABA Formal
Opinion 92-368, and Model Rule 4.4(b)).
244. In Resolution Trust Corp. v. First of America Bank, 868 F. Supp. 217 (W.D. Mich. 1994),
the court explained research efforts and other steps taken by receiving counsel, whom the
court ultimately decided had reached the wrong conclusion about his ethical obligations:
The privileged letter was received by plaintiff’s local counsel.  After returning
from vacation, plaintiff’s lead counsel asked that the letter be forwarded to him so
that he could obtain instructions from his client regarding a response.  At that
time plaintiff’s lead counsel was unaware of American Bar Association (ABA) For-
mal Opinion 92-368 but was experienced in a similar situation.  Plaintiff’s lead
counsel attempted to contact his client to inform the client of the disclosure and
obtain instructions. . . .  Lead counsel then researched the issue of what he should
do with the letter and concluded that “even the inadvertent disclosure of attorney
client privileged material terminated the privilege.”  After further consultation
with the client, lead counsel “out of a sense of fairness” but with no sense of a
duty, notified defendant’s counsel that plaintiff had the letter.
 . . . Plaintiff has not returned the letter.
Id. at 218, 220.
245. See Perlman, supra note 33, at 795 (noting that rulemakers typically try to craft rules R
that are consistent with other legal obligations, with other legal principles, and with other
ethical rules).
246. See supra notes 70–79 and accompanying text. R
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the issue provide a starting point for more research that the attorney
may or may not complete.  It would be more efficient for comments to
the Confidentiality of Information rule to provide specific examples
of how counsel can avoid transmitting confidential metadata.
Finally, professional conduct rules could also create greater effi-
ciencies for parties negotiating Privilege Disclosure Agreements and
seeking Privilege Disclosure Orders.  Given the current state of the
law, both transactional attorneys and litigators would be prudent to
negotiate such agreements in every matter.  The problem with negoti-
ating the agreements on a case-by-case basis is that it takes time and,
in the end, the agreements are often poorly drafted.  This problem is
apparent in case law: Attorneys draft Privilege Disclosure Agreements
and seek related Orders that contemplate handing over confidential
information, but that do not provide a definitive answer to the ques-
tion of privilege waiver and do not clearly delineate the obligations of
the receiving attorney upon receipt of a privileged document.247  Two
rules could achieve greater efficiency in this regard.  First, comments
to the current Confidentiality of Information rule could be amended
to specifically address the issues an attorney should discuss with a cli-
ent to receive informed consent to enter Privilege Disclosure Agree-
ments and Orders.248  Second, a new professional conduct rule that
provides comprehensive protection for confidential information after
disclosure and before a waiver ruling would make it unnecessary for
counsel to negotiate such protection in Privilege Disclosure Agree-
ments and Orders: They would simply rely on the protection con-
tained in the jurisdiction’s professional conduct rules.
D. Policymaker for the Profession
Finally, the bar has an interest in making policy decisions for the
profession.  To some, requiring an attorney to protect her opponent’s
confidential information is antithetical to an attorney’s obligation to
zealously represent the interests of her own client.249  The bar’s role
247. See, e.g., Alcon Mfg., Ltd. v. Apotex Inc., No. 1:06-cv-1642-RLY-TAB, 2008 WL
5070465, at *2–*3 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 26, 2008) (noting that receiving counsel used the privi-
leged information, forwarded it to experts, and challenged the disclosure as waiving the
privilege even though the court had entered a Privilege Disclosure Order).
248. See supra text accompanying notes 210–16 (discussing the need to seek informed R
consent).
249. See, e.g., SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN ET AL., ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND DIGITAL EVIDENCE
516 (2009) (asking, and not answering, in the concluding lines of a chapter dedicated to
privilege issues the following questions: “In light of the obligations imposed on the receiv-
ing party by Rule 26 and Model Rule 4.4(b), one might wonder: What happened to the
adversary system? Why can’t the receiving party take full advantage of the mistakes of her
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in developing professional conduct rules is to decide which interest
should prevail when competing interests conflict.  Several other
Model Rules of Professional Conduct require or permit an attorney to
put the interests of an opponent,250 a court,251 or a third party252
ahead of the lawyer’s own client.  The bar’s interest in confidentiality
should prevail in the area of inadvertent disclosure.253
The bar cannot rely on individual recipients of inadvertent disclo-
sures to protect the profession’s interest in confidentiality.  While
comments to Model Rule 4.4(b) tell receiving attorneys that they can
choose to protect an opponent’s inadvertently disclosed informa-
tion,254 it is not realistic to believe a sufficient number will make this
choice to adequately safeguard the profession’s commitment to confi-
dentiality.  Receiving attorneys as fiduciaries are necessarily—and
rightly—influenced by the interests of their own clients.255  As a result,
the organized bar is the body that must make this policy choice.256
adversary?”); Monroe H. Freedman, Erroneous Disclosure of Damaging Information: A Response
to Professor Andrew Perlman, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 179, 180 (2006) (arguing that “[t]he
traditional ethic of zeal is another casualty” of a professional obligation to not utilize an
opponent’s inadvertent disclosure); David D. Dodge, Eye on Ethics: Inadvertent Disclosure Re-
visited, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Sept. 2006, at 8, 8 (2006) (explaining that such requirements are “often
criticized as exulting the rights of a careless lawyer over the receiving lawyer’s own obliga-
tions of zealous representation to his client”).
250. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2009) (“Fairness to Opposing Party
and Counsel”).
251. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2009) (stating that if a lawyer’s
client offers false evidence to a tribunal, the lawyer “shall take reasonable remedial mea-
sures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal”).
252. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (2009) (permitting disclosure of
confidential information to protect a third party from substantial financial injury resulting
from a client’s crime or fraud).
253. See supra Part V.A (discussing the bar’s interest in confidentiality).
254. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 3 (2009).
255. See Freedman, supra note 249, at 180 (“The lawyer’s fiduciary obligation to her own R
client is one of several ethical duties that are often ignored or minimized in discussions of
erroneous disclosure of damaging information.”); Tuchler, supra note 207, at 1171 (ex- R
plaining that “the duty of loyalty seems to be peremptory, except as it is clearly made
inapplicable by the [Model Rules] themselves” and concluding that “to the extent the rules
allow it,” a receiving attorney must use an opponent’s inadvertent disclosure).
256. See Perlman, supra note 33, at 787–88 (explaining that rulemakers are in a better R
position because of time and resources to answer ethics questions and that they will come
to different conclusions than practicing attorneys).
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VI. PROPOSED COMMENTS TO MODEL RULE 1.6 ADDRESS PRIVILEGE
DISCLOSURE AGREEMENTS AND ORDERS AS WELL AS
METADATA
A. Proposed Comments Regarding Protecting Confidences in Metadata
Proposed Comments 19 and 20 to Model Rule 1.6, the Confiden-
tiality of Information rule, are found in Appendix A under the head-
ing “Metadata.”  These comments address the steps counsel should
take to prevent revealing client confidences in metadata.257  Proposed
Comment 19 provides specific examples of how counsel can fulfill the
obligation to protect confidential information contained in metadata.
The comment provides more guidance than contained in current
comments and ethics opinions and focuses on the methods that have
been associated with the fewest problems in practice.258  Because tech-
nology changes frequently, the comment contains a reference to a
state bar website that could contain links to scrubbing software re-
sources.259  The comment concludes by guiding attorneys that if they
wish to transmit documents electronically but do not have the techni-
cal ability to remove confidential metadata, they should seek expert
assistance.260  Proposed Comment 20 helpfully notes that metadata
may be the subject of discovery, so attorneys must avoid producing
privileged information and must also avoid spoliation.261  Taken to-
gether, the proposed comments would further the profession’s inter-
est in confidentiality.  Additionally, by providing this guidance in
comments to the rule rather than in a harder-to-find ethics opinion,
the change should further the bar’s interest in compliance and
efficiency.
B. The Proposed Comments Provide Guidance to Attorneys Regarding
Seeking Informed Consent to Privilege Disclosure Agreements
and Orders
Additional proposed comments to the Confidentiality of Informa-
tion rule, Model Rule 1.6, also found in Appendix A, would provide
guidance to attorneys entering Privilege Disclosure Agreements and
seeking Privilege Disclosure Orders.  Though this Article has used the
257. See infra app. A, Proposed Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6 cmts. 19–20.
258. See infra app. A, Proposed Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6 cmt. 19; see also
supra notes 68–79 and accompanying text (discussing the meager guidance that exists in R
current authorities regarding how attorneys should prevent disclosure of confidences in
metadata).
259. See infra app. A, Proposed Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6 cmt. 19.
260. See infra app. A, Proposed Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6 cmt. 19.
261. See infra app. A, Proposed Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6 cmt. 20.
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phrase “Privilege Disclosure Agreements and Orders,” the comments
would be indexed under a heading using the popular terminology:
“Clawbacks, Quick Peeks, and Other Agreements and Orders Regard-
ing the Disclosure of Confidential Information.”262  Proposed Com-
ments 21 and 22 explain that these Agreements and Orders implicate
the Confidentiality of Information rule because they contemplate the
disclosure of client confidences; accordingly, counsel must obtain the
client’s informed consent.263  Informed consent requires the lawyer to
communicate the “material risks of and reasonably available alterna-
tives to the proposed course of conduct”;264 Proposed Comments 23
through 28 are aimed at guiding an attorney through the pertinent
topics.265  Counsel might not otherwise understand the issues that are
relevant to the risks of and alternatives to a Privilege Disclosure Agree-
ment or Order.  Thus, the proposed comments further compliance
and efficiency, and may ultimately protect confidentiality.
Proposed Comment 23 provides a basic overview of the subjects
of counsel’s conversation with a client about a proposed Privilege Dis-
closure Agreement or Order—the privilege review protocol to be uti-
lized to protect against disclosure, receiving counsel’s obligations
when a document is received, and the risk of waiver in the present
case and in future litigation.266  These topics are further expanded
upon in Proposed Comments 24 through 27.  Proposed Comment 24
notes that a privilege review protocol may take various forms, and lists
factual and legal issues that may have a bearing on the type of privi-
lege review protocol adopted.267  Next, Proposed Comment 25 de-
scribes obligations that the agreement or order could impose upon
receiving counsel to protect the client’s confidences, highlighting pro-
visions that may be implemented to provide protection for the con-
tent of a disclosed document.268  Then, Proposed Comments 26 and
27 require counsel to discuss the continuing risks of waiver in both the
present case and in future cases.269  Proposed Comment 27 provides a
262. See infra app. A, Proposed Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6 cmts. 21–28.
263. See infra app. A, Proposed Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6 cmts. 21–22; see also
supra text accompanying notes 210–16 (discussing the need for informed consent under R
current Model Rule 1.6).
264. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(e) (2009) (defining informed consent).
265. See infra app. A, Proposed Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6 cmts. 23–28.
266. See infra app. A, Proposed Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6 cmt. 23.
267. See infra app. A, Proposed Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6 cmt. 24.
268. See infra app. A, Proposed Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6 cmt. 25; see also
supra Part IV.A.2 (discussing the current gaps in protection for the content of a disclosed
document prior to a waiver ruling).
269. See infra app. A, Proposed Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6 cmts. 26–27; see also
supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the risks of waiver).
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citation to authority that may help attorneys in state court craft an
agreement or order that is more likely to be enforced in subsequent
courts,270 particularly in light of the fact that subsequent courts are
not bound to do so under FRE 502.271  Finally, Proposed Comment 28
notes that such agreements may be appropriate in non-litigation mat-
ters and outlines the issues that counsel should discuss with the client
to receive informed consent.272
VII. A PROPOSED PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE GOVERNING
DISCLOSURE AND RECEIPT OF PRIVILEGED AND WORK
PRODUCT PROTECTED INFORMATION
Appendix B contains “Proposed Model Rule of Professional Con-
duct 4.5: Duties of Sending and Receiving Lawyers When Privileged or
Work Product Protected Information Is Disclosed,” along with pro-
posed comments.273  The rule is intended to replace the current
Model Rule 4.4(b), as well as ethics opinions, case law, and any other
authority governing an attorney’s response to inadvertent disclosure
by an opponent.  Placing all of the requirements in a single rule is
consistent with the interests of efficiency and compliance discussed in
Part V.
Under Proposed Rule 4.5, receiving counsel’s duties are triggered
when counsel knows or reasonably should know that he or she re-
ceived an opponent’s privileged or work product protected informa-
tion.274  Receiving attorneys cannot escape their obligations under the
rule by determining that the disclosure was not “inadvertent.”275  An
alternative trigger under the proposed rule is notice from the sending
270. See infra app. A, Proposed Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6 cmt. 27; Tucker v.
Ohtsu Tire & Rubber Co., 191 F.R.D. 495, 499–501 (D. Md. 2000); see also supra note 144 R
and accompanying text.
271. FED. R. EVID. 502(c)–(d).
272. See infra app. A, Proposed Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6 cmt. 28; see also
supra Part IV.B (discussing problems faced by transactional attorneys under current rules).
273. See infra app. B, Proposed Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.5.  Although the
topic of “unauthorized disclosure” is beyond the scope of this Article, this proposed rule
could be expanded slightly to address that issue as well.  This approach has been taken in
Tennessee’s proposed rule. See Petition of the Tennessee Bar Association for the Adoption
of Amended Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct (May 13, 2009), available at http://
www.tba.org/ethics/amends_051309/2009_rules_petition_withallexhibits.pdf.
274. See infra app. B, Proposed Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.5(a).
275. See infra app. B, Proposed Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.5 cmt. 2.  This ad-
dresses the problem inherent in requiring attorneys to make a determination of “inadver-
tence” to determine if their duties under a professional conduct rule have been triggered.
See supra notes 13–18, 126, 136 and accompanying text (providing examples of this prob- R
lem); see also supra text accompanying notes 236–41 (discussing how removing the term R
“inadvertent” from the rule could improve compliance).
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lawyer.276  After either triggering event, the proposal requires receiv-
ing attorneys to protect the content of the privileged or work product
information pending a waiver determination.  The receiving attorney
is prohibited from reading further than necessary to determine the
document’s privileged or work product status, prohibited from dis-
seminating the document or information about its contents to others,
and is required to follow the sending attorney’s instructions regarding
returning, deleting, or destroying the document and information
about its contents.277  The receiving attorney is only allowed to main-
tain a copy to be submitted to the court under seal for a waiver
determination.278
The following Sections explain the specific application of these
provisions in litigation, outside of litigation, and with regard to confi-
dences in metadata.
A. The Proposed Rule Would Complement and Supplement Current
Litigation Rules
Proposed Rule 4.5 is intended to complement and supplement
the key provisions of FRCP 26(b)(5)(B).  The proposal borrows from
the components of this federal civil procedure rule in that a receiving
lawyer must return, sequester, or destroy a privileged document when
directed to do so by the sender.279  Like FRCP 26(b)(5)(B), the pro-
posed rule allows the receiving attorney to submit the document to a
court for a determination of waiver or a determination that the docu-
ment is not otherwise privileged or work product protected.280
Supplementing FRCP 26(b)(5)(B) to address problems discussed
in this Article, Proposed Rule 4.5 applies to any disclosure of confi-
276. See infra app. B, Proposed Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.5(b).  If counsel
intentionally discloses privileged or work product protected information, disclosing coun-
sel can notify receiving counsel that he or she need not abide by the requirements of the
rule. See infra app. B, Proposed Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.5 cmt. 7.
277. See infra app. B, Proposed Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.5(a)–(b).  The pro-
posed provisions allowing a supervisory attorney to be consulted (as envisioned by Model
Rules 5.1(b) and 5.2(b)) or a disinterested attorney to be consulted for purposes of seek-
ing advice regarding compliance with the rule (as envisioned in Model Rule 1.6(b)(4)) are
the only provisions that allow communication with another attorney about the contents of
the document. See infra app. B, Proposed Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.5(a)(1) &
cmt. 4; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(4), 5.1(b), 5.2(b) (2009).
278. See infra app. B, Proposed Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.5(c).
279. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B); infra app. B, Proposed Model Rules of Prof’l Con-
duct R. 4.5(a)(3)–(4).
280. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B); infra app. B, Proposed Model Rules of Prof’l Con-
duct R. 4.5(c).
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dential information, not just information produced in discovery.281
Second, the proposed rule requires receiving counsel to provide notice
that he or she has received a privileged or work product document,
similar to the only requirement of the current Model Rule of Profes-
sional Conduct 4.4(b).282  Finally, the proposal makes clear that the
receiving attorney seeking a waiver ruling should not make reference
to the contents of the privileged document in court filings or
argument.283
The result should be a workable rule that protects confidentiality
pending a waiver ruling in both federal and state courts.  By clearly
stating the requirements in the rule, compliance and efficiency
should be enhanced as well.  The proposal could create problems if
sending attorneys use the rule as a sword to seek disqualification of
receiving counsel who did not recognize that a document was privi-
leged or work product protected.284  This may also lead to additional
ethics complaints to state bars.  Fear of such accusations and ethics
complaints may cause receiving attorneys to over-identify documents
as privileged and work product protected, creating additional and un-
necessary work for receiving attorneys.  These risks seem preferable to
instances in which receiving attorneys under-identify privileged and
work product protected documents (claiming they were not inadver-
tently produced) and use those documents strategically until the op-
ponent discovers the error.
B. The Proposed Rule Provides a Framework for Addressing Inadvertent
Disclosure for Transactional Lawyers
Proposed Model Rule 4.5 is crafted to require receiving attorneys
to protect the content of privileged and work product protected docu-
ments disclosed in non-litigation matters, returning any such docu-
ment to the sender.285  Unlike their litigation counterparts,
transactional attorneys have no easy means to seek a waiver ruling.286
281. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B); infra app. B, Proposed Model Rules of Prof’l Con-
duct R. 4.5 (lacking any confinement to discovery); see also supra text accompanying notes
151–52. R
282. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2009); infra app. B, Proposed
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.5(a)(2); see also supra text accompanying notes 153–59. R
283. See infra app. B, Proposed Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.5(c); see also supra
text accompanying notes 160–61. R
284. See supra note 159 and accompanying text (explaining that disqualification appears R
to be more likely if a rule prohibits counsel’s conduct).
285. See infra app. B, Proposed Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.5(a)–(b); see also
supra Part IV.B.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 171–73. R
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Under Model Rule 4.4(b), this means that the sending attorney had
no means to seek the return of the document; under the proposal, it
would mean that the receiving lawyer would have no means to keep
the document.  The new “status quo” of document protection in trans-
actions is preferable in light of the increasing amount of inadvertent
disclosure and the reality that all clients have an interest in mitigating
the damage of an inadvertent disclosure.  While this proposed rule
will not cause a transactional attorney to unlearn the contents of a
document that was disclosed, it can lessen some of the harm of a
disclosure.
A potential problem under the proposal is non-compliance by re-
ceiving attorneys.  When transactional attorneys dispute the proper
disposition of a document under the rule, they have no simple means
to seek resolution by a court (as would their litigator counterparts).
But the strong language—requiring receiving attorneys to “follow the
sending lawyer’s instructions regarding returning, deleting, or de-
stroying” the document and information about its contents287—
should avert most disputes.
C. The Proposed Rule Directly Addresses the Metadata Issue for
Litigators and Non-litigators
Finally, Proposed Rule 4.5 addresses privileged and work product
protected information found in an opponent’s metadata.  Under the
proposal, the receiving attorney’s duty is simple: If privileged or work
product information is in the metadata, the lawyer’s obligations are
the same as if the information were found in any other document.288
Acknowledging the legitimate uses of metadata,289 the rule does not
prohibit metadata review for receiving attorneys.290  The sending at-
torney has a duty to prevent disclosure of confidential metadata under
Model Rule 1.6(a); the proposed rule reinforces the importance of
this obligation.291
287. See infra app. B, Proposed Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.5(a)(4).
288. See infra app. B, Proposed Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.5 cmts. 1, 5 (defining
a “document” as a writing, electronically stored information, metadata, and other embed-
ded electronic information, and stating that the rule applies when privileged or work prod-
uct protected information is found in metadata).
289. See supra text accompanying notes 186–87 (discussing uses of metadata). R
290. See infra app. B, Proposed Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.5 cmt. 5.
291. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2009).  The proposed rule is pref-
erable to a rule that prohibits deliberately searching for metadata, which might give send-
ing attorneys the false impression that they do not have to prevent metadata disclosure. See
supra note 188 and accompanying text. R
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Opponents of this proposed approach might argue that even if a
blanket prohibition is inappropriate, a blanket rule could prohibit at-
torneys from reviewing the metadata if their purpose is finding privi-
leged or work product protected information.  As a practical matter,
the result under such a rule is likely no different from that provided
by the proposal.  Attorneys searching metadata for some legitimate
purpose may still find privileged information, and attorneys who de-
liberately hunt for metadata to find privileged information could
point to a legitimate reason for the search.  The proposed rule is pref-
erable because it does not create the increased likelihood of ethics
complaints with no discernible benefit.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Professional conduct rules are a necessary component of a more
comprehensive “inadvertent disclosure” solution.  Continuing defer-
ence to the law of waiver provides no relief for transactional attorneys,
allows misuse of confidential information pending a waiver ruling in
litigation, and does not adequately address the issues posed by
metadata.  The revisions to professional conduct rules proposed in
this Article would accomplish more than a peaceful co-existence with
recent changes to the federal civil procedure and evidence rules.  The
proposed amendments would protect the profession’s interest in con-
fidentiality, create a more efficient framework for addressing inadver-
tent disclosure, and lead to greater compliance by attorneys.  All of
these improvements are essential for attorneys and their clients to per-
severe in an age of increasing inadvertent disclosures.
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APPENDIX A
PROPOSED COMMENT TO MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
1.6: CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION
Metadata
[19] Lawyers must exercise reasonable care to avoid revealing
confidential information in metadata (the hidden “data about data”
or embedded electronic information contained in electronic docu-
ments).  Lawyers may fulfill their confidentiality obligation by provid-
ing documents to non-parties in non-electronic formats (such as by
printing, copying, or faxing documents).  If counsel desires to provide
electronic documents to non-clients, the safest way to remove confi-
dential metadata is through the use of “scrubbing” software.  Links to
information about scrubbing software programs are available at [juris-
dictions that adopt this rule will insert a website address where links to
such programs are maintained].  Lawyers who do not have the techno-
logical ability to implement these resources should hire experts to set
up systems to remove metadata when documents are transmitted
electronically.
[20] In litigation, metadata may be the proper subject of discov-
ery.  With the client’s informed consent, lawyers should adopt privi-
lege review protocols to detect and avoid producing privileged or
work product protected metadata. See cmts. 23–24.  Any methods uti-
lized to avoid production of privileged or protected metadata must
not result in spoliation of evidence or the violation of Rule 3.4’s prohi-
bition against altering, destroying, or concealing material with poten-
tial evidentiary value.
Clawbacks, Quick Peeks, and Other Agreements and Orders Regarding the
Disclosure of Confidential Information
[21] On behalf of their clients, attorneys sometimes enter
“clawback,” “quick peek,” or other agreements in which they agree
with opposing counsel about the consequences of disclosing confiden-
tial client information.  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) advisory commit-
tee’s note on 2006 amendment (describing clawback and quick peek
agreements); FED. R. EVID. 502(d) advisory committee’s note (same).
In litigation, attorneys may also seek entry of a court order imple-
menting these agreements. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 502(d).
[22] These agreements and orders implicate Rule 1.6(a) because
they foresee the possible disclosure of client confidences and dictate
the protections to be afforded the client’s confidential information
after disclosure.  Accordingly, counsel must seek the client’s informed
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consent prior to entering such an agreement or seeking such an or-
der. See Rule 1.0(e) (defining “informed consent” as an agreement by
the client after the lawyer has “communicated adequate information
and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available
alternatives to the proposed course of conduct”).
[23] To provide adequate information about the risks and alter-
natives available to the client regarding clawbacks, quick peeks, and
other such agreements and orders, lawyers should discuss the follow-
ing subjects that bear on the issue: (1) Privilege Review Protocol for
Documents to Be Produced in Discovery: What method or methods
will be utilized to detect privileged or work product protected infor-
mation prior to production in discovery, and what factual and legal
issues have a bearing on the decision regarding methodology?; (2)
Receiving Counsel’s Obligations to Protect Client’s Confidential In-
formation: What event will trigger opposing counsel’s obligations to
protect the client’s disclosed information and what are the obliga-
tions?; and (3) Waiver Standard and Risk of Waiver: What standard
will the court apply to determine waiver?  What is the risk of waiver in
the present case?  What is the risk of waiver in a future case?
[24] Privilege Review Protocol for Documents to Be Produced in
Discovery.  The client must give informed consent to the privilege re-
view protocol (methods that will be used to detect privileged or work
product protected information) that will be utilized in association
with any clawback, quick peek, or similar proposed agreement or or-
der.  The protocol appropriate for the client may be influenced by
both factual and legal issues that should be discussed with the client,
including the volume of documents or electronically stored informa-
tion to be reviewed, the time constraints of discovery, the financial
stakes of the present case and possible future litigation, the cost of
various review protocol options and their effectiveness, the sensitivity
of information that may be revealed, protections afforded the dis-
closed information prior to a waiver ruling under the proposed agree-
ment or order, see cmt. 25, and the risks of waiver in the present case
and possible future litigation, see cmts. 26–27.
[25] Receiving Counsel’s Obligations to Protect Client’s Confi-
dential Information.  A lawyer must seek the client’s informed consent
regarding the receiving attorney’s obligations under the proposed
agreement or order to protect the client’s confidential documents if
disclosed.  Receiving counsel’s obligations could be triggered in the
following instances: (1) by notice from the sending lawyer that a confi-
dential, privileged, or work product protected document was pro-
duced; (2) by receiving counsel’s knowledge that he or she has
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received an opponent’s confidential, privileged, or work product pro-
tected document; or (3) by some other event or events.  Receiving
counsel’s obligations to protect the client’s confidential information
could include not reading or disseminating the document or informa-
tion about its contents, retrieving information about the document
and information about its contents (if already disseminated), and re-
turning, destroying, deleting, or sequestering the document and in-
formation about its contents pending a waiver ruling. See, e.g., FED. R.
CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility,
Formal Op. 92-368 (1992), withdrawn by Formal Op. 05-437 (2005).
The lawyer should impress upon the client that the receiving attorney
cannot “unlearn” any information contained in a disclosed document,
despite any other protections provided.
[26] Waiver Standard and Risk of Waiver in the Present Case.
The lawyer must also seek informed consent to the standard that the
court will apply to determine if a disclosure waives privilege or work
product protection.  Clients should also be informed that even with
that standard in place, the court could rule that a disclosure waived
privilege or work product protection if counsel is unable to satisfy the
standard.  Counsel should explain this risk to the client and explain
alternatives that would mitigate this risk (such as a strongly worded
presumption against waiver in the agreement or order).
[27] Risk of Waiver in Subsequent Litigation. Lawyers must seek
informed client consent to the risk of waiver in subsequent litigation
under the terms of the agreement or order.  When a matter is origi-
nally pending in federal court, parties are ensured that subsequent
courts must enforce a “no waiver” order. FED. R. EVID. 502(d).  Thus,
the strongest protection against waiver in a subsequent case is a fed-
eral court order that makes waiver unlikely in the first case.  In con-
trast, when a matter is originally pending in state court, subsequent
courts are not mandated to enforce an order concerning waiver. See
id.  Accordingly, state court litigants must consider the risk that the
proposed order would not be enforced in a future court, and if the
order is not enforced, the risk that any disclosure may be viewed as a
waiver under the substantive law of a subsequent court. See Tucker v.
Ohtsu Tire & Rubber Co., 191 F.R.D. 495, 499–501 (D. Md. 2000) (ex-
plaining factors that may influence a court’s decision regarding en-
forcement of a prior court’s order and noting that there is “less need
for deference and comity when the order involved is really an agree-
ment by counsel approved, almost as a ministerial act, by the court”).
[28] Non-litigation Matters.  In non-litigation matters, lawyers
may wish to enter clawback-type agreements to protect against the ad-
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verse consequences of disclosing confidential documents to an oppo-
nent.  If the non-litigation matter requires counsel to provide
opposing counsel with a volume of documents (similar to a document
production in litigation), counsel should seek client consent to a pro-
tocol to detect confidential information, discussing the matters listed
in Comment 24.  In all other matters, counsel should seek the client’s
informed consent to all other aspects of the proposed agreement in
light of the client’s facts, including the following: (1) the risk of dis-
closing confidential information under the circumstances of the mat-
ter; (2) the benefits of the proposed agreement (focusing on the
receiving attorney’s obligations to protect and return the client’s con-
fidential information if revealed, as discussed in Comment 25); (3)
the risks inherent in the agreement, including no easy access to a
court to enforce the agreement and the risk of waiver in subsequent
litigation in a court that is not obligated to enforce the agreement;
and (4) available alternatives.
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APPENDIX B
PROPOSED MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 4.5: DUTIES OF
SENDING AND RECEIVING LAWYERS WHEN PRIVILEGED OR WORK
PRODUCT PROTECTED INFORMATION IS DISCLOSED
(a) When a lawyer receives from another lawyer a document that
the receiving lawyer knows or reasonably should know is attorney-cli-
ent privileged or work product protected, the receiving lawyer:
(1) shall not read the document further than reasonably neces-
sary to determine it is privileged or work product protected and shall
not disseminate the document (or information about its contents) to
anyone other than a supervisory lawyer and/or a disinterested lawyer
consulted to secure legal advice about the receiving lawyer’s compli-
ance with this rule; and
(2) shall promptly notify the sending lawyer; and
(3) shall retrieve and sequester the document (including dupli-
cates and information about the document’s contents); and
(4) other than as permitted in subsection (c), shall follow the
sending lawyer’s instructions regarding returning, deleting, or de-
stroying the document (including duplicates) and deleting or destroy-
ing any information about the document’s contents.
(b) A receiving lawyer is also required to follow the requirements
of subsections (a)(3)–(4) if a sending attorney notifies the receiving
lawyer that an identified document is privileged or work product pro-
tected.  The receiving lawyer shall not read the document or dissemi-
nate the document or information about its contents after receiving
notice from sending counsel.
(c) The receiving lawyer may maintain under seal a copy of the
document that may be submitted to the court in which the matter is
pending for a waiver ruling no later than thirty days after receiving the
sending lawyer’s (a)(4) instructions.  In any such proceeding, the re-
ceiving lawyer shall not refer to the contents of the document in any
brief or in argument before the court.  The receiving lawyer shall not
retain any copy of the sealed document in his or her files and shall
destroy the sealed document if it is not submitted to the court within
thirty days.
Proposed Comment
[1] Under this rule, a “document” includes all writings and elec-
tronically stored information, including a document’s metadata and
other embedded electronic information.  In litigation, the receiving
attorney should apply the law of the jurisdiction where the matter is
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pending to determine attorney-client privilege or work product pro-
tection.  In non-litigation matters, the receiving attorney should apply
the law of this jurisdiction to determine if the document would be
protected by the attorney-client privilege or as work product if the
document had been requested in discovery in litigation in this juris-
diction.  Any uncertainty regarding a document’s status should be re-
solved in favor of counsel complying with the requirements of this
rule.  Whether a receiving attorney reasonably should have known
that a document is privileged or work product protected turns on
whether an attorney who had actual knowledge of the contents of the
document should have made the determination that the document
was privileged or work product protected.
[2] The rule does not require (or allow) the receiving attorney to
determine if the disclosure was “inadvertent” or if attorney-client privi-
lege or work product protection was waived by the disclosure.  Attor-
ney-client privilege or work product protection is determined without
regard to whether such protection may have been waived by
disclosure.
[3] When two or more lawyers are associated with one another to
represent a client, if any one of them knows that a document is cov-
ered by this rule, the associated lawyers shall not read the document
because doing so is not reasonably necessary to determine if it is privi-
leged or work product protected.
[4] If a lawyer consults another lawyer to ensure compliance with
this rule, the consulted lawyer should be one who has not and will not
represent the client in the continuing matter, unless he or she is a
supervisory lawyer of the receiving lawyer as described in Rules 5.1(b)
and 5.2(b).
[5] Unless the parties have agreed or a court has ordered, receiv-
ing attorneys are not prohibited from reviewing a document’s
metadata or other embedded electronic information.  However, once
a receiving attorney finds privileged or work product protected infor-
mation in the metadata or embedded electronic information, the re-
view must cease under subsection (a)(1) of this rule and the other
requirements of this rule are fully applicable.
[6] This rule does not prohibit the receiving lawyer from seeking
a ruling that (1) the document is not privileged or work product pro-
tected; or (2) that the document’s disclosure waived privilege or work
product protection.  If a receiving lawyer seeks such a determination,
the receiving lawyer shall not refer to or rely upon the contents of the
document in making this argument.  This requirement puts counsel
in no different position than if the document had appeared on the
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sending party’s privilege log and the receiving lawyer had argued that
the document based on its description was not privileged or work
product protected.
[7] In a case or other matter in which an attorney intends to pro-
vide opposing counsel with privileged or work product protected doc-
uments, sending counsel can notify the receiving attorney in writing
that he or she is not obligated to abide by the terms of this rule for
identified documents.
